cor wrote:

> Don't you feel safer already?
>
> ----
> Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2006 11:18:07 PDT
> From: "Peter
> Subject: Air Traffic Controllers Chafe at Plan to Cut Staff
>
> A drive by the Federal Aviation Administration to cut the
number of air traffic controllers nationally by 10 percent
below negotiated levels, and even more sharply at places
like the busy radar center here, is producing tension, anger
and occasional shows of defiance among controllers. One of
the new changes may have safety implications: ending of
contractual protection against being kept working on a
controller's radar screen for more than two hours without a
break. Having just one controller on duty is also
problematic [as noted in the recent wrong-runway episode in
Lexington KY (RISKS-24.41)]. [Source: Matthew L. Wald, *The
New York Times*, 20 Sep
> 2006; PGN-ed, TNX to Lauren Weinstein]


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/washington/20control.html


Don't you get it sir? The FAA is now controlled by Lesbian
Bull-Dikes. The focus now in the FAA is kissing the black
ass, Diversity SCAMS, EEO, Female mentoring programs, etc.

Air Safety is not on the priority list any longer in the
FAA. It's just lip service.

Look at this link.

http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm

This FAA Black only RACIST boondoggle at a RESORT SPA was
funded by YOUR tax money authorized by Feminist and Black
Managers in the FAA

Air Traffic Controllers?
Systems Technicians who maintain the critical Radar and
Communication equipment?

Hell who needs that?

The new edict in the FAA is "Kiss that Black Ass" at all
cost. It IS the new priority in the FAA not Air Safety. The
FAA has become a giant Government TIT sucking racist
organization ONLY focused on feel good social programs and
kissing the black ass and ridiculing and stressing out their
experienced white male employees. (See Lexington 17 year
Veteran WHITE Controller working double shifts with no sleep
and the violation of FAA orders at this location)

Air Safety is not a priority any longer in the new feel good
social engineering on your tax dime FAA.

If people don't call their elected representatives and raise
hell more people are going to die in preventable air
disasters. Lexington is the just the start. Why not cut out
all those Civil Rights empires in the FAA and spend that
money on people who count like Controllers and Technicians?

Until the Flying Public floods the FAA with calls of citizen
complaint the FAA will keep on full speed ahead "Kissing the
Black Ass" and wasting your tax dollars by the millions on
Civil rights empires and boondoggles.

All while the next air tragedy is looming

Here is the FAA HotLine

Call FAA toll-free 24 hours a day at 1-866-TELL-FAA
(1-866-835-5322)

Call and ask this simple question....

"Why is the FAA cutting critical staffing for controllers
and technicians at the same time they are funding a RACIST
organization to travel to a RESORT SPA to scheme ways to run
off white male employees and build your civil rights empires
on my tax dime"??

The families of the dead burned to toast people in Lexington
would like an answer to that question also.

"JohnSmith" > wrote in message
...
> cor wrote:
> Call and ask this simple question....

The only question here is why you think that nobody notices that in addition
to being a racist kook, you keep posting in the aviation groups using
various sock nyms. This is at least the fourth time you've posted the same
crap here under four different nyms in the past month.

Bwha-wha-wha-wha! What a maroon!

Having just one controller on duty is also
>problematic [as noted in the recent wrong-runway episode in
>Lexington KY (RISKS-24.41)]. [Source: Matthew L. Wald, *The
>New York Times*, 20 Sep
> > 2006; PGN-ed, TNX to Lauren Weinstein]
>
>
>http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/washington/20control.html
>

Non-issue. The pilots were responsible for verifying that they were
on the correct runway.

Ron Lee

Ron Lee wrote:
> Having just one controller on duty is also
>
>>problematic [as noted in the recent wrong-runway episode in
>>Lexington KY (RISKS-24.41)]. [Source: Matthew L. Wald, *The
>>New York Times*, 20 Sep
>>
>>>2006; PGN-ed, TNX to Lauren Weinstein]
>>
>>
>>http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/washington/20control.html
>>
>
>
> Non-issue. The pilots were responsible for verifying that they were
> on the correct runway.
>
> Ron Lee

Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.

It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.

How can you justify cutting controller staffing while you
spend millions on Civil Rights empires in the FAA?

You are on an IFR approach. You are bumping minimums low on
fuel. Would you rather have the FAA spend money on..

1. Air Traffic controllers and ILS technicians or...

2. Kissing the Black Ass boondoggles at a resort spa?

I choose number 1.

The FAA chooses number 2.

It is an issue

John Mazor wrote:
> "JohnSmith" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>cor wrote:
>>Call and ask this simple question....
>
>
> The only question here is why you think that nobody notices that in addition
> to being a racist kook, you keep posting in the aviation groups using
> various sock nyms. This is at least the fourth time you've posted the same
> crap here under four different nyms in the past month.
>
> Bwha-wha-wha-wha! What a maroon!
>
>

Maroon?

If you are going to give me crap(I am guessing you are a
probably either a Bull Dike, Black or Homosexual)then spell
it correctly asswipe

ma‧roon1  /məˈrun/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled
Pronunciation[muh-roon] –adjective
1. dark brownish-red.
2. Chiefly British.
a. a loudly exploding firework consisting of a cardboard
container filled with gunpowder.
b. a similar firework used as a danger or warning signal, as
by railway brakemen.

Racist Kook? So I guess you are saying it's OK for the FAA
to cut controller staffing but fund with the same money
racist boondoggles by Black FAA employees at resort spas?

I hope YOU are not caught in IFR low on fuel with your
alternate down for minimums.

All those worthless Black Civil Servants in the FAA at that
resort spa sucking the Guvment Tit will not help you much.

"Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners and the
downfall of America as we know it"

"JohnSmith" > wrote in message
. ..
>>
>> Bwha-wha-wha-wha! What a maroon!
>>
>
> Maroon?
>
> If you are going to give me crap(I am guessing you are a probably either a
> Bull Dike, Black or Homosexual)then spell it correctly asswipe
>
> ma?roon1 /m?'run/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled
> Pronunciation[muh-roon] -adjective
> 1. dark brownish-red.
> 2. Chiefly British.
> a. a loudly exploding firework consisting of a cardboard container filled
> with gunpowder.
> b. a similar firework used as a danger or warning signal, as by railway
> brakemen.
>

You didn't watch enough cartoons.

JohnSmith > wrote:
> Maroon?

http://www.randomhouse.com/wotd/index.pperl?date=19970731

> Racist Kook?

A more accurate characterization might be "misogynistic and racist troll."

> So I guess you are saying it's OK for the FAA
> to cut controller staffing but fund with the same money
> racist boondoggles by Black FAA employees at resort spas?

The link you provided earlier indicates the organization is a private one,
and nothing you've provided indicates any direct funding from the FAA.
Furthermore, there do not appear to be any racial restrictions on joining
the group. And relative to the composition of the civilian labor force,
which allegedly is composed of ~26% minorities, the FAA workforce is
composed of ~18% minorities[1]. Your trolling is, as usual, misinformed and
trivially debunked.

[1] http://www.nbcfae.org/Documents/Menu/NBCFAE-BusinessCase.pdf

"JohnSmith" > wrote in message
. ..
> John Mazor wrote:
>> "JohnSmith" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>>>cor wrote:
>>>Call and ask this simple question....
>>
>> The only question here is why you think that nobody notices that in
>> addition to being a racist kook, you keep posting in the aviation groups
>> using various sock nyms. This is at least the fourth time you've posted
>> the same crap here under four different nyms in the past month.
>>
>> Bwha-wha-wha-wha! What a maroon!
>
> Maroon?

Whoosh! Google the phrase and see how you're still a maroon.

> If you are going to give me crap(I am guessing you are a probably either a
> Bull Dike, Black or Homosexual)then spell it correctly asswipe

Your guessing abilities are no better than your ability to put on a sock

> ma?roon1 /m?'run/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled
> Pronunciation[muh-roon] -adjective
> 1. dark brownish-red.
> 2. Chiefly British.
> a. a loudly exploding firework consisting of a cardboard container filled
> with gunpowder.
> b. a similar firework used as a danger or warning signal, as by railway
> brakemen.

Bwha-wha-wha!

> Racist Kook? So I guess you are saying it's OK for the FAA to cut
> controller staffing but fund with the same money racist boondoggles by
> Black FAA employees at resort spas?

You still can't guess.

> I hope YOU are not caught in IFR low on fuel with your alternate down for
> minimums.

I hope you don't think anyone is fooled by this into thinking that you know
squat about aviation.

> All those worthless Black Civil Servants in the FAA at that resort spa
> sucking the Guvment Tit will not help you much.

You're still a racist kook, too.

> "Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners and the downfall of America
> as we know it"

It's maroons like you who gave rise to PC.

JohnSmith > wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
@bignews5.bellsouth.net:

> Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
> double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
> violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.

Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The
presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant.

> It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.

In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk. For
example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
FAA, you are certainly able to sue.

Just please stop ranting about it here.

"JohnSmith" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a double shift
> without proper rest combined with the FAA violating their own staffing
> orders at KLEX.
>
> It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.
>

How is the FAA liable? The tower controller did everything required and
without any error. What might have been different had the staffing policy
been followed and a second controller had been on duty in the TRACON?

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> JohnSmith > wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
> @bignews5.bellsouth.net:
>
>> Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
>> double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
>> violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.
>
> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
> The
> presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
> irrelevant.

Really? Then why bother having them?

Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.

The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If
the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might
have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly
recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident -
same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years
ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This
time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then
he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by
the second (required) controller.

This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up
such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.

>> It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.
>
> In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk.
> For
> example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
> FAA, you are certainly able to sue.

The FAA has been successfully sued as part of post-acciident liabilities,
and we're not talking chump change, either. Furthermore, there are other
"liabilities" involved - the PR and political price to be paid when an FAA
screw-up results in an accident, expecially one with many fatalities.

> Just please stop ranting about it here.

Safety isn't his agenda here.

To blame this accident on an FAA "social engineering" program is like saying
that the reason that Johnny can't read is because he had to listen to a
classroom discussion of African-American history. He's using a legitimate
safety issue as an excuse to plaster aviation newsgroups with racist crap.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
>> The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
>> irrelevant.
>>
>
> Really? Then why bother having them?
>

Controllers? For separation.


>
> Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
> airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.
>

Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the crew?
What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26 was
runway 22?


>
> The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions.
> If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he
> might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a
> fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same
> incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner
> crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the
> same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught
> it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that should
> have been performed by the second (required) controller.
>

The job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller
was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't have guaranteed
a second controller in the tower cab.


>
> This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
> pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
> have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
> that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
> airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make
> up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.
>

Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient
redundacy.

John Mazor wrote:
> "JohnSmith" > wrote in message
> . ..
>
>>John Mazor wrote:
>>
>>>"JohnSmith" > wrote in message
...
>>>
>>>
>>>>cor wrote:
>>>>Call and ask this simple question....
>>>
>>>The only question here is why you think that nobody notices that in
>>>addition to being a racist kook, you keep posting in the aviation groups
>>>using various sock nyms. This is at least the fourth time you've posted
>>>the same crap here under four different nyms in the past month.
>>>
>>>Bwha-wha-wha-wha! What a maroon!
>>
>>Maroon?
>
>
> Whoosh! Google the phrase and see how you're still a maroon.
>
>
>>If you are going to give me crap(I am guessing you are a probably either a
>>Bull Dike, Black or Homosexual)then spell it correctly asswipe
>
>
> Your guessing abilities are no better than your ability to put on a sock
>
>
>>ma?roon1 /m?'run/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled
>>Pronunciation[muh-roon] -adjective
>>1. dark brownish-red.
>>2. Chiefly British.
>>a. a loudly exploding firework consisting of a cardboard container filled
>>with gunpowder.
>>b. a similar firework used as a danger or warning signal, as by railway
>>brakemen.
>
>
> Bwha-wha-wha!
>
>
>>Racist Kook? So I guess you are saying it's OK for the FAA to cut
>>controller staffing but fund with the same money racist boondoggles by
>>Black FAA employees at resort spas?
>
>
> You still can't guess.
>
>
>>I hope YOU are not caught in IFR low on fuel with your alternate down for
>>minimums.
>
>
> I hope you don't think anyone is fooled by this into thinking that you know
> squat about aviation.
>
>
>>All those worthless Black Civil Servants in the FAA at that resort spa
>>sucking the Guvment Tit will not help you much.
>
>
> You're still a racist kook, too.
>
>
>>"Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners and the downfall of America
>>as we know it"
>
>
> It's maroons like you who gave rise to PC.
>
>
Yep, You gotta be Gay

John Mazor wrote:
> "Judah" > wrote in message
> . ..
>
>>JohnSmith > wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
:
>>
>>
>>>Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
>>>double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
>>>violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.
>>
>>Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
>>The
>>presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
>>irrelevant.
>
>
> Really? Then why bother having them?
>
> Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
> airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.
>
> The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If
> the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might
> have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly
> recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident -
> same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years
> ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This
> time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then
> he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by
> the second (required) controller.
>
> This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
> pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
> have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
> that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
> airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up
> such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.
>
>
>>>It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.
>>
>>In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk.
>>For
>>example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
>>FAA, you are certainly able to sue.
>
>
> The FAA has been successfully sued as part of post-acciident liabilities,
> and we're not talking chump change, either. Furthermore, there are other
> "liabilities" involved - the PR and political price to be paid when an FAA
> screw-up results in an accident, expecially one with many fatalities.
>
>
>>Just please stop ranting about it here.
>
>
> Safety isn't his agenda here.
>
> To blame this accident on an FAA "social engineering" program is like saying
> that the reason that Johnny can't read is because he had to listen to a
> classroom discussion of African-American history. He's using a legitimate
> safety issue as an excuse to plaster aviation newsgroups with racist crap.
>
>

FAA is cutting funding for Air Traffic controllers BUT they
are continuing to fund social feel good meetings at Black
only gatherings at Resort Spas.

http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm

And do you really think that identifying that anomaly in FAA
funding and staffing priorities makes a person racist?

How do you define "Whistle blowing"?
How do you define Discrimination?
What is Reverse Racism to you?
Define poor funding priorities in Air Safety?

Did you know the FAA will not allow Anglo/Saxon only social
groups?

Is that not racist???

Did you know there are laws protecting whistle blowers
especially if it involves safety of human life?

What is more important for National Air Safety?

Additional Air traffic Controllers or Black only social
gatherings at resort spas??

Which one???

Don't have the balls to answer Mr.PC Brainwashed person??

No doubt you are Black or Gay or have been mind programmed
so long by PC brainwashing that the identification of ANY
minority SCAM makes that person automatically racist.

You poor unable to form your own thought Government School
educated brainwashed *******.

Freedom has left your soul
You are blinded by the PC God of Distortion

Reminder- It is called Freedom of Speech here in America

As long as the FAA discriminates against Anglo-Saxon
Heterosexual males of European ancestry our group will not
go away.

EVER

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
k.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>>
>>> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
>>> The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
>>> irrelevant.
>>
>> Really? Then why bother having them?
>
> Controllers? For separation.

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
any darkened room on the ground will do.

>> Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
>> airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.
>
> Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the
> crew? What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26
> was runway 22?

Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If you're
truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots, please
follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and markings and
notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do so here.

Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY
DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL
CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI
INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI
INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF
STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT
& FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE
DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
revamped after the accident.

>> The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions.
>> If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he
>> might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a
>> fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same
>> incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner
>> crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the
>> same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have
>> caught it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that
>> should have been performed by the second (required) controller.
>
> The job that should have been performed by the second (required)
> controller was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't
> have guaranteed a second controller in the tower cab.

And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring ground
movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.
There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he
hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that
area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he
wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by
FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

>> This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an
>> essential pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more
>> accidents than have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the
>> chain of events that has to occur before you actually get an accident.
>> The secret to airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links
>> that can make up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.
>
> Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient
> redundacy.

That's exactly my point. What's yours?

Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in part
on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less safe.

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

"BillClinton" > wrote in message
.. .
> John Mazor wrote:

>> To blame this accident on an FAA "social engineering" program is like
>> saying that the reason that Johnny can't read is because he had to listen
>> to a classroom discussion of African-American history. He's using a
>> legitimate safety issue as an excuse to plaster aviation newsgroups with
>> racist crap.
>
> FAA is cutting funding for Air Traffic controllers BUT they are continuing
> to fund social feel good meetings at Black only gatherings at Resort Spas.
>
> http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm
>
> And do you really think that identifying that anomaly in FAA funding and
> staffing priorities makes a person racist?

The way you have presented it, yes.

> How do you define "Whistle blowing"?
> How do you define Discrimination?
> What is Reverse Racism to you?

What is racism? It's what we see here in your posted crap.

> Define poor funding priorities in Air Safety?

The list of examples of, and reasons for poor funding prioritie in aviation
safety is so long that the one item that you have a hard on for is
insignificant.

> Did you know the FAA will not allow Anglo/Saxon only social groups?

They also do not permit all-male hiring policies. So what? Exactly what is
it that an all-Anglo-Saxon social group could accomplish that can't be done
if non-Anglo-Saxons are allowed to be present?

> Is that not racist???

No. It tends to prevent racist activities. Duh.

> Did you know there are laws protecting whistle blowers especially if it
> involves safety of human life?

Yes. So what? The story came to light, didn't it?

> What is more important for National Air Safety?
>
> Additional Air traffic Controllers or Black only social gatherings at
> resort spas??

So if FAA stopped that program, we'd have enough controllers? Or even more
controllers? Bwha-wha-wha-wha! Gawd, your naivete is exceeded only by your
racist cant. Arguing from your lack of political acumen is the Internet
equivalent of bringing a knife to a gun fight.

> Don't have the balls to answer Mr.PC Brainwashed person??

I just did, Mr. Crow.

> No doubt you are Black or Gay or have been mind programmed so long by PC
> brainwashing that the identification of ANY minority SCAM makes that
> person automatically racist.

When it's presented the way you have here, it's racism, not safety.

> You poor unable to form your own thought Government School educated
> brainwashed *******.

You have done well, glasshoppah, to master the technique of cutting and
pasting from "The Maroon's Guide to Racist Taunts and Other Irrelevant
Answers" - I see many such examples in your posting. I particularly like
your use of accusatory Items 6, 23, 31, and 61, and the ironic choice of
your nom de Web here. I must, however, dock you points for omitting Item 4,
where you would accuse me of being Jewish - confer with your anti-semitic
colleagues on the advantages of that rant - and the ever-popular Item 9,
where you would accuse me of being a paid shill for The eViL GuMMinT. So
you only get a B-minus here, but don't let that discourage you in your quest
for complete ignorance.

> Freedom has left your soul
> You are blinded by the PC God of Distortion

Not only do I curse PC, I doubly curse maroons like you that gave rise to
it.

> Reminder- It is called Freedom of Speech here in America

Freedom of speech is both a two-edged sword, and our most precious freedom.

It's a two-edged sword because it means that maroons like you have access to
the marketplace of ideas, even if what you're peddling is the argumentive
equivalent of rotten fish.

It's our most precious freedom because of the heavy price we pay: letting
maroons like you annoy us.

> As long as the FAA discriminates against Anglo-Saxon Heterosexual males of
> European ancestry our group will not go away.

Close, but your Know Nothing argumentative skills still leave much to be
desired. The correct answer is, "As long as loser maroons like you can
manage to cover the cost of a third-hand computer and $10 a month in ISP
charges to post anonymously (and, in your case, using identifiable sock
puppets), then you and your ilk will continue to go trolling with outrageous
crap that you may or may not actually believe."

John Mazor writes:

> And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
> cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
> airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
> any darkened room on the ground will do.

The pilot-in-command is the final authority. The crash was the
pilot's fault. There was nobody else around, except the copilot, and
the PIC's decision is still final.

The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
However, if he's incompetent and screws up, he takes the full blame;
it's not anyone else's responsibility to check up on him.

Controllers function in an advisory capacity. The PIC can always
deviate from a controller's instructions, if he deems it necessary.

> Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
> statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
> chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
> intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."
>
> CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY
> DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL
> CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI
> INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI
> INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF
> STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT
> & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE
> DEFICIENCIES;
>
> Not all of that applies here ...

None of it applies here. ATC services were not deficient. No
conflicting instructions were given. There were no other aircraft
involved. And even on an unmarked grass strip, a competent pilot will
still check his heading before he rolls.

> And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
> aircraft from the gate have been doing?

He could be playing pool, and it would still be the sole
responsibility of the pilot-in-command. That's the say the FARs work,
and I think that's how they should work (it's inherited from maritime
law).

> There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he
> hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
> second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that
> area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he
> wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
> potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by
> FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

The PIC's negligence was so glaring in this case that any question of
ATC is moot. It is not ATC's job to hold the hand of pilots.

> Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
> miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
> redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap?

How many times?

> You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
> understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
> discussion"?

My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else
matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
> feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
> no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.

You're a funny guy!

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor writes:

>> You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
>> understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
>> discussion"?
>
> My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else
> matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat.

Then your understanding of how the aviation safety system works is woefully
deficient.

It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an
extremely hazardous form of transportation.

"Steve Foley" > wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
> "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
> ...
>> The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
>> feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
>> no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
>
> You're a funny guy!

I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA citation
using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe
operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me."

It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on
where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two. Ditto
on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
> "Steve Foley" > wrote in message
> news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
> > "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >> The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
> >> feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
> >> no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
> >
> > You're a funny guy!
>
> I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA
citation
> using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe
> operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me."
>
> It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on
> where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two.
Ditto
> on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety.
>
>

The Feds will never come after Mxsmanic. He's never touched the controls of
an airplane. He plays with Microsoft Flight Simulator somewhere in France,
but know more than all the pilots here combined.

John Mazor writes:

> It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an
> extremely hazardous form of transportation.

It depends on who's sitting in the seat. And with some pilots,
aviation still _is_ an extremely hazardous form of transportation.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Steve Foley" > wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
> "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
> ...
>> The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
>> feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
>> no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
>
> You're a funny guy!


Stupid, but funny.

"Steve Foley" > wrote in message
news:4CWRg.3916$SD5.2126@trndny01...
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "Steve Foley" > wrote in message
>> news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
>> > "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
>> > ...
>> >> The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
>> >> feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
>> >> no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
>> >
>> > You're a funny guy!
>>
>> I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA
>> citation
>> using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe
>> operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me."
>>
>> It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on
>> where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two.
>> Ditto
>> on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety.
>
> The Feds will never come after Mxsmanic. He's never touched the controls
> of
> an airplane. He plays with Microsoft Flight Simulator somewhere in France,
> but know more than all the pilots here combined.

Thanks, that's about what I figured.

<SNIP>
> You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
> understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
> discussion"?

It is for those narrow minded idiots who can't see the
importance of integrity of the entire National Airspace
System. It's the "We don't need **** but the 2 guys in the
Cockpit" fallacy.

In 1994 the FAA started full speed ahead Kissing the Black
Ass and promoting secretaries into key safety positions for
Diversity numbers without proper training or background
knowledge.

Senior Managers in the FAA were even brainwashed by Bull
Dike edicts from inside the Lesbian controlled Beltway in
D.C. FAA Hdq. that you do not need a aviation background to
manage Controllers or Technicians so the need for a
"Background" was eliminated so more Blacks and Women could
be promoted into FAA Management

Now, the FAA has a big bucket of DOG **** that will get
worse as more WHITE MALE HETEROSEXUAL experienced
controllers and technicians retire or quit in disgust.

More people will die across America in aviation disasters
like KLEX unless the FAA returns to the business model of
Air Safety first rather than "Kissing the Black Ass"

See FAA TAX FUNDED BOONDOGGLE

http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm

Or, unless in their(FAA)current sick twisted HR Diversity
Matrix it's OK to kill a few people as long as the Black and
Female FAA Employees remain HAPPY. Sorta like the we don't
need a red light until more people die at the intersection
mentality. That is why they call the FAA the "Tombstone"
agency. People must die before they get off their ass and do
something.

The current FAA Administrator would rather blame the Air
Traffic controllers for funding shortfalls and beat up on
NATCA and abuse their key safety employees with benefit cuts
rather than look at the MILLIONS wasted each year Kissing
the Black Ass in Civil Rights and EEO Empires that have
NOTHING to do with day to day Air Safety or operation of the
FAA.

In other words, it's FUBAR in the FAA with their Air Safety
priorities

But, remember, we are racist and bigots for bringing you
these hard but true facts of the organization entrusted with
American Air Safety. The hard words help the FAA and their
PC Minions deflect and shield themselves from public scrutiny.

It's all sick and wrong

"Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners"

"AlbertSnore" > wrote in message
. ..

> <SNIP>

And further snip the sock puppet's bull**** racist spin that at this point
is, well, making me snore, Albert.

Your amusement value here has just about played out.

Zzzzzzzz...

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in
> windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such
> as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a
> tower, any darkened room on the ground will do.
>

The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the sky
in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.


>
> Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If
> you're truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots,
> please follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and
> markings and notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do
> so here.
>

Jon, you got out in front of the investigation when you concluded that
anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout played a role in this
accident.


>
> Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
> statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
> chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
> intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."
>
> CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED
> BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT
> LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE
> TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING
> TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF
> EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE
> & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF
> THESE DEFICIENCIES;
>
> Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
> role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
> revamped after the accident.
>

Does any of it apply here?


>
> And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
> aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring ground
> movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
> that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.
>

What was there for him to monitor? Was there another aircraft or vehicle
moving on the airport? It's been reported that he turned to some
administrative tasks after clearing Comair for takeoff, I've heard no
mention of any other aircraft in the air or on the ground.


>
> There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
> he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
> second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
> that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
> he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
> potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
> by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.
>

He had not been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller. Nothing to date suggests any error on the part of the
controller or any failure to meet any of his responsibilities.


>
> That's exactly my point. What's yours?
>

That a second controller would not ensure the chain was broken.


>
> Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
> miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
> redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
> fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in
> part on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less
> safe.
>

These pilots didn't miss one thing, they missed MANY indicators that they
were on the wrong runway.


>
> You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
> understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
> discussion"?
>

Nobody's denying that the crew missed it. The cause of the crash is already
known, they attempted to takeoff on the wrong runway, a runway that was too
short. The only purpose of the investigation is to attempt to determine why
they did so.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in
>> windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there?
>> Such
>> as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a
>> tower, any darkened room on the ground will do.
>
> The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
> room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the
> sky in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.

And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
and runways, don't they? Which was my point.

>> Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If
>> you're truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots,
>> please follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and
>> markings and notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do
>> so here.
>
> Jon, you got out in front of the investigation when you concluded that
> anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout played a role in this
> accident.

What I said was "Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the
anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too."
So yes, I did get a bit ahead here, but I wasn't specific as to what the
"role" was, and the NTSB already has said that it is looking at those
factors, so I didn't just make it up.

>> Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
>> statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
>> chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
>> intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."
>>
>> CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED
>> BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO
>> ALERT
>> LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE
>> PROGRESSIVE
>> TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING
>> TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF
>> EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS,
>> SIGNAGE
>> & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF
>> THESE DEFICIENCIES;
>>
>> Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
>> role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
>> revamped after the accident.
>
> Does any of it apply here?

What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility for
everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
airports.
>
>> And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
>> aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring
>> ground
>> movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
>> that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.
>
> What was there for him to monitor? Was there another aircraft or vehicle
> moving on the airport? It's been reported that he turned to some
> administrative tasks after clearing Comair for takeoff, I've heard no
> mention of any other aircraft in the air or on the ground.

He would have been watching the accident aircraft. If those "administrative
tasks" normally should have been performed by the controller at the other
position, then the working controller was prevented from sticking to his
position. I don't know what those tasks were, so we'll have to wait and
see.
>
>> There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
>> he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
>> second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
>> that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
>> he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
>> potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
>> by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.
>
> He had not been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
> second controller. Nothing to date suggests any error on the part of the
> controller or any failure to meet any of his responsibilities.

See previous.
>
>> That's exactly my point. What's yours?
>
> That a second controller would not ensure the chain was broken.

I already said that, just above: "There's no guarantee that he would have
noticed the erroneous movement if he hadn't been required to turn to other
tasks because of the lack of the second controller."

So yes, the working controller may not have noticed the aircraft even if
there were a second contoller. OTOH, he might have done so, just as the
controller (and crew) noticed the exact same error, same airport, same
runways, 13 years ago, and warned the crew..

>> Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
>> miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
>> redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
>> fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in
>> part on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less
>> safe.
>
> These pilots didn't miss one thing, they missed MANY indicators that they
> were on the wrong runway.

And redundancy has prevented many accidents where the crew "missed MANY
indicators." Try reading some ASRS reports.

>> You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
>> understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
>> discussion"?
>
> Nobody's denying that the crew missed it. The cause of the crash is
> already known, they attempted to takeoff on the wrong runway, a runway
> that was too short. The only purpose of the investigation is to attempt
> to determine why they did so.

I think we're getting bogged down in semantics when we really aren't that
far apart. You also got caught in some crossfire with another poster, where
a lot of my vehemence was directed at him.

That's what the probable cause statement probably will start out with - the
crew took the wrong runway. Then there will be contributing factors, which
might include airport issues. There also will be a list of findings, a list
of recommendations, and a lengthy report.

Accident investigators and other safety experts view all this as a whole.
The probable cause statement, in itself, does not convey an true
understanding of the accident, which is necessary for taking steps to
prevent another one like it. Unfortunately, that's what most of the media -
and some posters - focus on.

"TheNPC" > wrote in message
.. .
> <SNIP>
> There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
> he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
> second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
> that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
> he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
> potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
> by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.
>
>
>
> Looking at all the comments and chatter regarding the subject of the
> Lexington crash this paragraph best hits the nail on the head. We will
> never know the hypothetical out come because the FAA violated their own
> staffing orders at Lexington that night. The hypothetical scenario of two
> controllers on duty and the related safety matrix was made impossible by
> the FAA's refusal to staff their ATCT IAW their own orders.
>

Following the order doesn't put another controller in the tower cab.

John Mazor wrote:


>>The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
>>room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the
>>sky in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.
>
>
> And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
> and runways, don't they? Which was my point.

There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to
continue to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had
been issued.

>
> What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
> here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility for
> everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
> responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
> drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
> airports.

Narrow-minded views?

For a Part 121 flight crew to takeoff during nighttime on a runway
without operating runway edge lights rises to the level of criminal
negligence. At that point ambiguous or even misleading airport signage
became irrelevant.

Had the signs caused them to end up on a dead-end taxiway, well, ok,
shame on the signs. But, for them to take an unlighted runway, and
diregard their heading bug or FMS runway display, well, gee..."Honest
officer, I wouldn't have driven 90 the wrong way on this one way street
and collided with the school bus, had only the one-way signs had been
more visible."

Sam Spade wrote:

>
>
> There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to
> continue to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had
> been issued.

He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.

"Newps" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
> controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.
>

He has to be in the tower to be sure there is no other aircraft. Once he
does that and issues the clearance there's no obligation to watch the
airplane to make sure it departs on the correct runway. He certainly can do
that, but there's no requirement for him to do so. After all, if a pilot
cannot be relied upon to takeoff from the correct runway without a
controller monitoring his every surface movement then we must install
control towers at every airport and prohibit surface movements if all
surfaces are not visible to the tower controller.

> Using your logic with only one aircraft the controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.

Well, he has to be there to ensure that there really =is= only one aircraft.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor wrote:
>
>>>The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
>>>room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the
>>>sky in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.
>>
>> And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
>> and runways, don't they? Which was my point.
>
> There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to continue
> to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had been issued.

I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of ground
traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores. As I have
repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that doesn't
guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can show that
it wouldn't have been caught, either. We know from an incident report that
13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at the same
airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this time?

>> What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views
>> expressed here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary
>> responsibility for everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and
>> controller responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I
>> wasn't drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the
>> two airports.
>
> Narrow-minded views?

Comments to the effect that once you could see that the crew screwed up by
using the wrong runway, nothing else matters.

Which means that nothing else needs to be examined or fixed. Perhaps that
was not the intent of these unthinking reactions, but that was exactly the
mentality and the investigative mindset in the early days of aviation.
Unless someone could prove mechanical failure or some other factor over
which the pilot had no control, it was his damn fault, period, end of
discussion, end of investigation. That's hardly a productive approach to
safety.

> For a Part 121 flight crew to takeoff during nighttime on a runway without
> operating runway edge lights rises to the level of criminal negligence.
> At that point ambiguous or even misleading airport signage became
> irrelevant.

Oh, really? Irrelevant? I'll be surprised if the NTSB agrees with that
sweeping conclusion.

> Had the signs caused them to end up on a dead-end taxiway, well, ok, shame
> on the signs. But, for them to take an unlighted runway, and diregard
> their heading bug or FMS runway display, well, gee..."Honest officer, I
> wouldn't have driven 90 the wrong way on this one way street and collided
> with the school bus, had only the one-way signs had been more visible."

An overly simplistic analogy, to say the least. Rather than deconstruct
it - which wouldn't convince you anyway - suppose we wait and see what the
NTSB report says after the investigation is completed.

-- John Mazor
"The search for wisdom is asymptotic."

"Except for Internet newsgroups, where it is divergent..."
-- R J Carpenter

Newps writes:

> He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
> controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.

Correct. Most airports don't have controllers in the tower, and yet
pilots manage to use those airports without any problem. This is
possible even with multiple aircraft, provided that all the pilots are
competent.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Jose writes:

> Well, he has to be there to ensure that there really =is= only
> one aircraft.

Why? How do people survive at uncontrolled airports, then?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Newps writes:
>
>> He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
>> controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.
>
> Correct. Most airports don't have controllers in the tower, and yet
> pilots manage to use those airports without any problem. This is
> possible even with multiple aircraft, provided that all the pilots are
> competent.
>
Not quite true. For the most part, if there is a tower then there is a
controller. Some towers at smaller airfields close during the early
morning hours and then the field reverts to a pilot controller field,
but during normal working hours when the tower is open the controllers
are there. A more true statement would have been most airports don't
have towers/controllers.

"John Mazor" > wrote in
:

> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
> ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores. As I
> have repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
> doesn't guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can
> show that it wouldn't have been caught, either. We know from an
> incident report that 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the
> same error at the same airport with the same two runways. Why did that
> not happen this time?

Because the logic that "a second controller might have caught it but might
not" is inconclusive. As such it's a poor speculation to cause regulatory
actions, or even to claim that it was a ***cause*** of the accident.

Some airports have video cameras on line that allow people to watch the
runways. Maybe if they had a video camera installed on this runway, the
pilot's girlfriend would have been watching and called his cell phone to
warn him that he was about to take off on the wrong runway. It doesn't
guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can show that
it wouldn't have been caught that way, either.

Perhaps the accident was caused by the pilot's girlfriend or the lack of a
video camera?

A million other things could have happened that might have helped catch the
error and didn't. It's inconclusive speculation about circumstances that
aren't regulated. Even if there were a second controller, unless the
regulations require that the controller monitor each and every airplane
from taxi through departure handoff, a second controller would have had no
impact on the situation. Unless you can prove that the reason the first
controller turned away was specifically to perform a task that the second
controller would have been doing, or prove that the second controller would
have been staring out the window instead of doing his own job, you simply
have no case.
Conjecture like this does nothing to improve the safety of the air traffic
system. It only distracts from determining the things that really were
causal in this accident to try to prevent them from happening in the
future.

The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the Air
Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.

What's your mission?

John Mazor writes:

> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of ground
> traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores. As I have
> repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that doesn't
> guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can show that
> it wouldn't have been caught, either. We know from an incident report that
> 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at the same
> airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this time?

Apparently workload did not permit.

If an FAA regulation had existed to prevent crews from flying if they
didn't know which aircraft to fly, then that would have prevented the
accident, too, since this crew initially got onto the wrong aircraft.
That did not bode well for the rest of the flight.

> Oh, really? Irrelevant? I'll be surprised if the NTSB agrees with that
> sweeping conclusion.

You don't think that pilots should check for a lighted runway?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

TheNPC writes:

> The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
> They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
> You can take that too the bank

Normally any lawsuit would have to demonstrate that the FAA's actions
directly caused or contributed to the accident. That won't be
possible here, although a simple emotional appeal to the jury might
work.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Newps wrote:
>
>
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to
>> continue to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had
>> been issued.
>
>
> He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
> controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.

That is not my logic at all. Note my words, "The controller had no
obligation to continue to watch...once takeoff clearance had been
issued." Doesn't that imply there was an obligation to watch to some
point? That hardly could be done if the controller were not in the tower.

What if the weather had been thick ground fog with RVR at takeoff
minimums? Would the controller deny takeoff clearance in that case
since he couldn't see the aircraft at any time?

John Mazor wrote:


>
>
>>For a Part 121 flight crew to takeoff during nighttime on a runway without
>>operating runway edge lights rises to the level of criminal negligence.
>>At that point ambiguous or even misleading airport signage became
>>irrelevant.
>
>
> Oh, really? Irrelevant? I'll be surprised if the NTSB agrees with that
> sweeping conclusion.
>
The NTSB is not the district attorney.
>
>>Had the signs caused them to end up on a dead-end taxiway, well, ok, shame
>>on the signs. But, for them to take an unlighted runway, and diregard
>>their heading bug or FMS runway display, well, gee..."Honest officer, I
>>wouldn't have driven 90 the wrong way on this one way street and collided
>>with the school bus, had only the one-way signs had been more visible."
>
>
> An overly simplistic analogy, to say the least. Rather than deconstruct
> it - which wouldn't convince you anyway - suppose we wait and see what the
> NTSB report says after the investigation is completed.

Overly simplistic to you,perhaps because you seem to think a Part 121
crew taking off at night on an unlighted runway is no big deal.

>

Judah wrote:

>
> What's your mission?

We is a public relations person for the pilots' union.

TheNPC wrote:

>
>
> Read the NTSB report on the Guam accident by Korean Air. Direct Cause is
> not required. Only "Contributing" cause by a responsible entity. At
> Guam, the FAA was held liable by the "Failure to follow their orders and
> failure to provide adequate management of the NAS"

Guam was quite different. An FAA employee had purposefully disabled the
MSAW system contrary to FAA safety requirements. That, indeed, became a
contributing factor to the accident.
>

Sam Spade wrote:

> Judah wrote:
>
>>
>> What's your mission?
>
>
> We is a public relations person for the pilots' union.

HE, not WE. ;-)

John Mazor wrote:

>
> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of ground
> traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.

No, it's required.

You're trying to make an argument that the controller has no
responsibility to monitor what goes on on the airfield. He must to the
extent possible.

Sam Spade wrote:

> Newps wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Sam Spade wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to
>>> continue to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had
>>> been issued.
>>
>>
>>
>> He most certainly does. Using your logic with only one aircraft the
>> controller doesn't even have to be in the tower.
>
>
> That is not my logic at all. Note my words, "The controller had no
> obligation to continue to watch...once takeoff clearance had been
> issued." Doesn't that imply there was an obligation to watch to some
> point? That hardly could be done if the controller were not in the tower.
>
> What if the weather had been thick ground fog with RVR at takeoff
> minimums? Would the controller deny takeoff clearance in that case
> since he couldn't see the aircraft at any time?

If only this thread could be mooted...


In rec.aviation.ifr TheNPC > wrote:
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > TheNPC writes:
> >
> >
> >>The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
> >>They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
> >>You can take that too the bank
> >
> >
> > Normally any lawsuit would have to demonstrate that the FAA's actions
> > directly caused or contributed to the accident. That won't be
> > possible here, although a simple emotional appeal to the jury might
> > work.
> >


> Read the NTSB report on the Guam accident by Korean Air.
> Direct Cause is not required. Only "Contributing" cause by a
> responsible entity. At Guam, the FAA was held liable by the
> "Failure to follow their orders and failure to provide
> adequate management of the NAS"

> Since they violated their AT staffing orders at LEX and
> failed to adequately manage the NAS that tragic Sunday
> morning the FAA is liable at LEX. The point is mute if two
> controllers would have saved the lives of 49 people. Because
> the FAA violated their AT staffing orders at LEX we will
> never know. The question is not if but how much will the FAA
> pay out?

> A good lawyer will eat the FAA and the City of Lexington
> alive. Most Government lawyers suck anyway.

--
Don Poitras

TheNPC > wrote in
:

> The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
> They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
> You can take that too the bank

The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
accident.

Mxsmanic wrote:
> Jose writes:
>
>
>>Well, he has to be there to ensure that there really =is= only
>>one aircraft.
>
>
> Why? How do people survive at uncontrolled airports, then?
>

They usually survive quite nicely, provided the traffic level isn't too
high (doen't ask me when that threshold is reached ;-)

But, when it is an operating control tower with Class D airspace the
requirements imposed on pilots change from non-towered and the
controller has duties and responsibilities he obviouslly does not have
at a non-towered airport.

"TheNPC" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
> They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
> You can take that too the bank
>

Violation of the staffing order had no impact on the accident.

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
>
> Normally any lawsuit would have to demonstrate that the FAA's actions
> directly caused or contributed to the accident. That won't be
> possible here, although a simple emotional appeal to the jury might
> work.
>

These cases tend to be based solely on emotional appeals to juries.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
>
> That is not my logic at all. Note my words, "The controller had no
> obligation to continue to watch...once takeoff clearance had been issued."
> Doesn't that imply there was an obligation to watch to some point? That
> hardly could be done if the controller were not in the tower.
>
> What if the weather had been thick ground fog with RVR at takeoff
> minimums? Would the controller deny takeoff clearance in that case since
> he couldn't see the aircraft at any time?
>

Not on that day, but based on the odd turn this case has taken that may
become the procedure. After all, if the making sure the airplane is on the
assigned runway is deemed to be the controller's responsibility the
controller must have the authority to deny takeoff clearance if he cannot
see the runway.

Newps wrote:
> You're trying to make an argument that the controller has no
> responsibility to monitor what goes on on the airfield. He must to the
> extent possible.
>
No, I am not saying that at all. If the controller in this case checked
that the runway lights on 22 were on and the runway was clear, he had
done what he had to do. Did you expect him to watch the guy roll down
the runway when he was the only traffic around?

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
> and runways, don't they? Which was my point.
>

They don't have to keep watching them after they've determined them to be
clear. There was no need for the controller to keep watching the Comair
after the clearance was issued, that's the point you're missing.


>
> What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
> here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility
> for everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
> responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
> drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
> airports.
>

Based on what has been reported the controller met all of his
responsibilities.


>
> He would have been watching the accident aircraft.
>

Watching it for what purpose? Was separation an issue here or not?


>
> If those
> "administrative tasks" normally should have been performed by the
> controller at the other position, then the working controller was
> prevented from sticking to his position. I don't know what those tasks
> were, so we'll have to wait and see.
>

No tasks prevented the controller from sticking to his position. All of the
duties and responsibilities of his position were successfully completed.

The tasks that were not successfully completed were those of pilot. If
there had been just one person aboard Comair performing the duties of pilot
this accident would not have happened. What tasks were the crew doing that
prevented either one of them from performing the duties of pilot?


>
> So yes, the working controller may not have noticed the aircraft even if
> there were a second contoller. OTOH, he might have done so, just as the
> controller (and crew) noticed the exact same error, same airport, same
> runways, 13 years ago, and warned the crew..
>

That crew didn't need warning, they caught the error themselves. That's the
question here, why did this crew attempt a takeoff when there were so many
indicators that they were on the wrong runway?


>
> And redundancy has prevented many accidents where the crew "missed MANY
> indicators." Try reading some ASRS reports.
>

I have. Many.

TheNPC writes:

> Read the NTSB report on the Guam accident by Korean Air.
> Direct Cause is not required.

Lawsuits are decided in the courts, not by the NTSB. Two very
different places.

> Since they violated their AT staffing orders at LEX and
> failed to adequately manage the NAS that tragic Sunday
> morning the FAA is liable at LEX.

Hardly. Cause and effect has to be shown.

> A good lawyer will eat the FAA and the City of Lexington
> alive. Most Government lawyers suck anyway.

The government must consent to be sued.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of ground
> traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>

Here's a link to FAA Order 7110.65, feel free to relieve your suspicion:

http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/ATC/index.htm


>
> As I have
> repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
> doesn't guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can
> show that it wouldn't have been caught, either.
>

That's true, there could have been a dozen other controllers in the tower
cab, and that still wouldn't have guaranteed that the error would have been
caught, but no one can show that it wouldn't have been caught, either. But
what anyone can show is that if there had been just one person aboard that
airplane performing the duties of pilot this crash would not have happened.
Why wasn't there a functioning pilot aboard that airplane? What was the
crew doing that took them away from their assigned tasks and
responsibilities?


>
> We know from an incident
> report that 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at
> the same airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this
> time?
>

We know from that report that the pilot caught the error at the same time
the controller did. Why did that not happen this time?


>
> Comments to the effect that once you could see that the crew screwed up by
> using the wrong runway, nothing else matters.
>

What matters is determining why the crew screwed up, if possible. Has a CVR
transcript been made available yet?

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> A million other things could have happened that might have helped catch
> the
> error and didn't. It's inconclusive speculation about circumstances that
> aren't regulated. Even if there were a second controller, unless the
> regulations require that the controller monitor each and every airplane
> from taxi through departure handoff, a second controller would have had no
> impact on the situation. Unless you can prove that the reason the first
> controller turned away was specifically to perform a task that the second
> controller would have been doing, or prove that the second controller
> would
> have been staring out the window instead of doing his own job, you simply
> have no case.
> Conjecture like this does nothing to improve the safety of the air traffic
> system. It only distracts from determining the things that really were
> causal in this accident to try to prevent them from happening in the
> future.
>

The mystery here is why this crew could have made the error given that there
were so many indications that it was the wrong runway.



>
> The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the Air
> Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.
>
> What's your mission?
>

He's a front for the pilot's union. He's just trying to deflect some of the
responsibility for the crash from a couple of dues-paying members.

Judah wrote:
> TheNPC > wrote in
> :
>
>
>>The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
>>They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
>>You can take that too the bank
>
>
> The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
> accident.

They have everything to do with who will pay.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>> ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>>
>
> Here's a link to FAA Order 7110.65, feel free to relieve your
> suspicion:
>
> http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/ATC/index.htm

That's a useful link! If my understanding is correct, the following
extractions _may_ be relevant to this discussion:

"2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand."

"2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a
position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity
to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you
action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the
issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has
responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been
observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of
unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized."

"3-1-3. USE OF ACTIVE RUNWAYS

The local controller has primary responsibility for operations conducted
on the active runway and must control the use of those runways."

"3-1-5. VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL ON RUNWAYS

a. Ensure that the runway to be used is free of all known ground
vehicles, equipment, and personnel before a departing aircraft starts
takeoff or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold."

"3-1-7. POSITION DETERMINATION

Determine the position of an aircraft before issuing taxi instructions or
takeoff clearance.

NOTE-
The aircraft's position may be determined visually by the controller, by
pilots, or through the use of the ASDE."

"3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other movement
areas."

"3-7-2. TAXI AND GROUND MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

Issue, as required or requested, the route for the aircraft/vehicle to
follow on the movement area in concise and easy to understand terms. When
a taxi clearance to a runway is issued to an aircraft, confirm the
aircraft has the correct runway assignment.

NOTE-
1. A pilot's read back of taxi instructions with the runway assignment
can be considered confirmation of runway assignment."

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> TheNPC > wrote in
> :
>
>> The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
>> They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
>> You can take that too the bank
>
> The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
> accident.

I have to agree wholeheartedly here, in that court/jury decisions often bear
little relationship to the relevant safety issues as seen by safety
professionals. That's because the purpose of the courts is to "dispense
justice" (however that may be determined) whereas the purpose of a
competently and fairly conducted investigation is to figure out what went
wrong and try to see that it doesn't happen again. (Notice that terms like
"blame" and "fault" generally do not figure anywhere into an investigation
because those are legalistic terms that more properly belong in the legal
proceedings to determine monetary liability.)

Nevertheless, having said all that, it is also correct that the FAA can
bear, and has borne, legal responsibility for a share of the liabilities in
accidents, which is why you have to take with a grain of salt any
declarations by them that their actions had no role in whatever accident
they may be on the hook for. This, of course, is in addition to the
political motives for denying any failures on their part.

Juday wrote...
> The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
> accident.

Well, um...

While true in the sense that what the courts decide to "blame" may have
no bearing on the actual cause, past court cases do influence future
events. There are unintended consequences (which we debate all the time
here when we complain about insurance requirements and new FAA rules).
It is not inconcievalbe that the human factors which caused the pilots
to make [any given] error were aggrivated by "safety" requirements that
=were= a consequence of the failures of the US court system.

Not that that's likely to be relevant here, but attractive sweeping
statements don't always hold up under scrutiny.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> "John Mazor" > wrote in
> :
>
>> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>> ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores. As I
>> have repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
>> doesn't guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can
>> show that it wouldn't have been caught, either. We know from an
>> incident report that 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the
>> same error at the same airport with the same two runways. Why did that
>> not happen this time?
>
> Because the logic that "a second controller might have caught it but might
> not" is inconclusive.

Where have I said otherwise?

>As such it's a poor speculation to cause regulatory actions,

Your profound ignorance of how aviation safety works is showing.

> or even to claim that it was a ***cause*** of the accident.

I'm tired of repeating this, so I'm hoping that everyone gets it this time:

1. The crew screwed up.
2. Factors like the ones I have cited can be, and have been cited as
contributory causes to accidents.
3. Where human error is involved, contributing factors don't excuse the
human error, but they are vitally important to help explain how it happened
so that we can reduce the probability that it will happen again.

> Some airports have video cameras on line that allow people to watch the
> runways. Maybe if they had a video camera installed on this runway, the
> pilot's girlfriend would have been watching and called his cell phone to
> warn him that he was about to take off on the wrong runway. It doesn't
> guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can show that
> it wouldn't have been caught that way, either.
>
> Perhaps the accident was caused by the pilot's girlfriend or the lack of a
> video camera?

Perhaps your sense of sarcasm far outruns your knowledge of how aviation
safety works.

No, I take that back. Delete "perhaps".

> A million other things could have happened that might have helped catch
> the
> error and didn't. It's inconclusive speculation about circumstances that
> aren't regulated.

Correct, but it's up to the investigation to determine which "speculative"
factors are relevant. I don't know about you, but I'm not going to bet the
farm that none of the issues that I have mentioned will make it into the
NTSB report - or even the probable cause statement.

>Even if there were a second controller, unless the
> regulations require that the controller monitor each and every airplane
> from taxi through departure handoff, a second controller would have had no
> impact on the situation.

Can I borrow your crystal ball? If it can see events that well, I would
like to ask it for some winning Lotto numbers.

> Unless you can prove that the reason the first
> controller turned away was specifically to perform a task that the second
> controller would have been doing, or prove that the second controller
> would
> have been staring out the window instead of doing his own job, you simply
> have no case.

Cripes, pay attention, will you? I already have stated repeatedly that this
is speculative, but as the incident report showed, it's hardly an impossible
scenario.

> Conjecture like this does nothing to improve the safety of the air traffic
> system. It only distracts from determining the things that really were
> causal in this accident to try to prevent them from happening in the
> future.

Duh. So what should we say about your presumptive, absolutist declarations
here? At least I've been careful to make clear that mine are tentative and
that any opinions are meaningless until we get the NTSB report.

> The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the Air
> Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.

So "Incompetent pilots kill passengers in massive cockpit screw-up" wouldn't
sell as many papers or attract as many viewers?

When fearful flyers strap themselves in, they aren't even thinking about
controllers. They're worried about ceding all control over their fate to
the people up in front of the airplane. Or to put it more bluntly, when's
the last time you heard a Leno or Letterman joke about the air traffic
controller who showed up drunk at the airport?

Controller error makes it into the news, pilot error sells the news.

> What's your mission?

Trying to inject some facts and informed insight into the postings that we
get from so-called experts on aviation. God forbid that there should be
innocent lurkers out there who think that the bombastic declarations of some
of our posters are authoritative, complete, and credible.

-- John Mazor
"The search for wisdom is asymptotic."

"Except for Internet newsgroups, where it is divergent..."
-- R J Carpenter

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor writes:
>
>> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>> ground
>> traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores. As I have
>> repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
>> doesn't
>> guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can show
>> that
>> it wouldn't have been caught, either. We know from an incident report
>> that
>> 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at the same
>> airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this time?
>
> Apparently workload did not permit.

Duh.

> If an FAA regulation had existed to prevent crews from flying if they
> didn't know which aircraft to fly, then that would have prevented the
> accident, too, since this crew initially got onto the wrong aircraft.
> That did not bode well for the rest of the flight.

Do you have any idea how often this happens? (Apparently not.) Aircraft are
parked overnight but then are moved or reassigned, etc. They - the gate
agents, not the pilots - even board pax on the wrong aircraft because of
such conditions. Per se, it doesn't necessarily signify anything here.

>> Oh, really? Irrelevant? I'll be surprised if the NTSB agrees with that
>> sweeping conclusion.
>
> You don't think that pilots should check for a lighted runway?
>
> Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

I'm tempted to say that your sig apparently indicates some dyslexia problem
on your part. How else to explain the fact that despite repeated statements
by me that the crew screwed up, you keep throwing up a strawman argument to
the contrary. (And the term "throwing up" was not selected randomly here.)

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor wrote:
>
>>>For a Part 121 flight crew to takeoff during nighttime on a runway
>>>without operating runway edge lights rises to the level of criminal
>>>negligence. At that point ambiguous or even misleading airport signage
>>>became irrelevant.
>>
>> Oh, really? Irrelevant? I'll be surprised if the NTSB agrees with that
>> sweeping conclusion.
>>
> The NTSB is not the district attorney.

Which case do you want to argue here, the technical investigation or the
tort liability one?

>>>Had the signs caused them to end up on a dead-end taxiway, well, ok,
>>>shame on the signs. But, for them to take an unlighted runway, and
>>>diregard their heading bug or FMS runway display, well, gee..."Honest
>>>officer, I wouldn't have driven 90 the wrong way on this one way street
>>>and collided with the school bus, had only the one-way signs had been
>>>more visible."
>>
>> An overly simplistic analogy, to say the least. Rather than deconstruct
>> it - which wouldn't convince you anyway - suppose we wait and see what
>> the NTSB report says after the investigation is completed.
>
> Overly simplistic to you,perhaps because you seem to think a Part 121 crew
> taking off at night on an unlighted runway is no big deal.

Bz-z-z-z-t! Buy a vowel, get a clue, take a course in reading
comprehension, and then let us know when you've read and fully compehended
all my statements and position here.

I addressed all this in an earlier response to you, so just see the added
reply at the end.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>> ground
>> traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>
> Here's a link to FAA Order 7110.65, feel free to relieve your suspicion:
>
> http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/ATC/index.htm
>
>> As I have
>> repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
>> doesn't guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can
>> show that it wouldn't have been caught, either.
>
> That's true, there could have been a dozen other controllers in the tower
> cab, and that still wouldn't have guaranteed that the error would have
> been caught, but no one can show that it wouldn't have been caught,
> either. But what anyone can show is that if there had been just one
> person aboard that airplane performing the duties of pilot this crash
> would not have happened. Why wasn't there a functioning pilot aboard that
> airplane? What was the crew doing that took them away from their assigned
> tasks and responsibilities?
>
>> We know from an incident
>> report that 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at
>> the same airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this
>> time?
>
> We know from that report that the pilot caught the error at the same time
> the controller did. Why did that not happen this time?
>
>> Comments to the effect that once you could see that the crew screwed up
>> by
>> using the wrong runway, nothing else matters.
>
> What matters is determining why the crew screwed up, if possible. Has a
> CVR transcript been made available yet?

No. It will be published the first day of the public hearing if there is
one, or within a prescribed time frame if there isn't.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
k.net...
>
> "Judah" > wrote in message
> . ..
>>
>> A million other things could have happened that might have helped catch
>> the
>> error and didn't. It's inconclusive speculation about circumstances that
>> aren't regulated. Even if there were a second controller, unless the
>> regulations require that the controller monitor each and every airplane
>> from taxi through departure handoff, a second controller would have had
>> no
>> impact on the situation. Unless you can prove that the reason the first
>> controller turned away was specifically to perform a task that the second
>> controller would have been doing, or prove that the second controller
>> would
>> have been staring out the window instead of doing his own job, you simply
>> have no case.
>> Conjecture like this does nothing to improve the safety of the air
>> traffic
>> system. It only distracts from determining the things that really were
>> causal in this accident to try to prevent them from happening in the
>> future.
>
> The mystery here is why this crew could have made the error given that
> there
> were so many indications that it was the wrong runway.

Indeed, and succinctly put.

>> The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the Air
>> Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.
>>
>> What's your mission?
>
> He's a front for the pilot's union. He's just trying to deflect some of
> the
> responsibility for the crash from a couple of dues-paying members.

Bull****, and Stephen, you've just lost whatever respect I may have had for
you as an informed poster here. You obviously have no idea what these
discussions are all about, or you would have taken note of my repeated
declarations here that "the crew screwed up".

I know that will hardly keep you awake tonight, but then, my disappointment
in your self-evident, self-important ignorance doesn't cause me to lose any
sleep either. You're just another wannabe aviation safety ******.

AMF.

Newps writes:

> Judah wrote:
>
> > The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
> > accident.
>
> They have everything to do with who will pay.

But that won't prevent any accidents.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

I had composed this before I realized what a complete dolt you are, but I'll
post it for the record.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
>> and runways, don't they? Which was my point.
>
> They don't have to keep watching them after they've determined them to be
> clear. There was no need for the controller to keep watching the Comair
> after the clearance was issued, that's the point you're missing.

And there was no need for the controller to do so in the incident report
from 13 years ago - but he/she did it anyway, saw the aircraft lining up on
the exact same wrong runway at the exact same airport, and if the crew
hadn't caught it simultaneously, the controller would have been the one
responsible for preventing the exact same accident.

Instead of all these hair-splitting armchair critiques of exactly what the
controller might or might not have been *required* to do, we ought to admit
the possibilty of what the controller *might actually have done*. He/she
might have gone for a potty break, done some other chore... or seen the
Comair plane and warned the crew. We know that's possible because it
actually happened before.

>> What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views
>> expressed
>> here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility
>> for everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
>> responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
>> drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
>> airports.
>
> Based on what has been reported the controller met all of his
> responsibilities.

See previous.

>> He would have been watching the accident aircraft.
>
> Watching it for what purpose? Was separation an issue here or not?

See previous.

>> If those
>> "administrative tasks" normally should have been performed by the
>> controller at the other position, then the working controller was
>> prevented from sticking to his position. I don't know what those tasks
>> were, so we'll have to wait and see.
>
> No tasks prevented the controller from sticking to his position. All of
> the duties and responsibilities of his position were successfully
> completed.

See previous.

> The tasks that were not successfully completed were those of pilot. If
> there had been just one person aboard Comair performing the duties of
> pilot this accident would not have happened. What tasks were the crew
> doing that prevented either one of them from performing the duties of
> pilot?

Stephen, you very well know that I have not once tried to excuse the actions
of the crew. They screwed up.

>> So yes, the working controller may not have noticed the aircraft even if
>> there were a second contoller. OTOH, he might have done so, just as the
>> controller (and crew) noticed the exact same error, same airport, same
>> runways, 13 years ago, and warned the crew..
>
> That crew didn't need warning, they caught the error themselves. That's
> the question here, why did this crew attempt a takeoff when there were so
> many indicators that they were on the wrong runway?

Because human beings are not automatons who can be relied upon to perfectly
and always repeat the same performance every time under all conditions.
That's why we have redundancy and why it is important to reognize when it
fails. If all three electrical systems on an aircraft fail, do we just say
"Oh, well, the electrics failed, too bad" or do we want to find out why the
redundancy of three systems was not adequate in this case? Why should it be
any different when it's a human rather than a mechanical failure?

>> And redundancy has prevented many accidents where the crew "missed MANY
>> indicators." Try reading some ASRS reports.
>
> I have. Many.

Then you should be showing a little more informed and enlightened attitude
in this discussion.

God forbid that you should ever do this, but if you ended up a bloody smear
a mile short of the runway, would you be happy with a simplistic probable
cause statement (and summary judgments from all the armchair "experts" here
on the Internet) that "Pilot McNicholl failed to maintain adequate altitude
and situational awareness in his approach"? IOW, "The dumb ass, he didn't
have any business being at the controls." Or might you hope that the
investigation would also consider and give due importance to whatever
factors put you in that box in the first place?

"Newps" > wrote in message
. ..
>
>
> John Mazor wrote:
>
>>
>> I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>> ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>
> No, it's required.

Thanks.

John Mazor wrote:

>
>
> Bz-z-z-z-t! Buy a vowel, get a clue, take a course in reading
> comprehension, and then let us know when you've read and fully compehended
> all my statements and position here.
>
>

You and Steve are cut of the same cloth! ;-)

John Mazor wrote:

> "Newps" > wrote in message
> . ..
>
>>
>>John Mazor wrote:
>>
>>
>>>I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>>>ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>>
>>No, it's required.
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>
That is his opionion, John.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> Bull****, and Stephen, you've just lost whatever respect I may have had
> for you as an informed poster here. You obviously have no idea what these
> discussions are all about, or you would have taken note of my repeated
> declarations here that "the crew screwed up".
>
> I know that will hardly keep you awake tonight, but then, my
> disappointment in your self-evident, self-important ignorance doesn't
> cause me to lose any sleep either. You're just another wannabe aviation
> safety ******.
>

Jon, who are you trying to fool?

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> And there was no need for the controller to do so in the incident report
> from 13 years ago - but he/she did it anyway, saw the aircraft lining up
> on the exact same wrong runway at the exact same airport, and if the crew
> hadn't caught it simultaneously, the controller would have been the one
> responsible for preventing the exact same accident.
>
> Instead of all these hair-splitting armchair critiques of exactly what the
> controller might or might not have been *required* to do, we ought to
> admit the possibilty of what the controller *might actually have done*.
> He/she might have gone for a potty break, done some other chore... or seen
> the Comair plane and warned the crew. We know that's possible because it
> actually happened before.
>

See previous.


>
> Stephen, you very well know that I have not once tried to excuse the
> actions of the crew. They screwed up.
>

Yes, Jon, you said the crew screwed up. But you also imply the controller
screwed up. Based on what has been reported to date the controller met all
of his responsibilities without error. Your interest here is not advancing
aviation safety, it's relief of at least part of the Comair crew's
responsibility for this crash.


>
> Because human beings are not automatons who can be relied upon to
> perfectly and always repeat the same performance every time under all
> conditions. That's why we have redundancy and why it is important to
> reognize when it fails. If all three electrical systems on an aircraft
> fail, do we just say "Oh, well, the electrics failed, too bad" or do we
> want to find out why the redundancy of three systems was not adequate in
> this case? Why should it be any different when it's a human rather than a
> mechanical failure?
>

Jon, that doesn't answer my question and I'm confident you know that it does
not.

>
> Then you should be showing a little more informed and enlightened attitude
> in this discussion.
>

My attitude is a result of my efforts to be highly informed. I hope our
discussion has left you a bit better informed.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:

>That's true, there could have been a dozen other controllers in the tower
>cab, and that still wouldn't have guaranteed that the error would have been
>caught, but no one can show that it wouldn't have been caught, either. But
>what anyone can show is that if there had been just one person aboard that
>airplane performing the duties of pilot this crash would not have happened.
>Why wasn't there a functioning pilot aboard that airplane? What was the
>crew doing that took them away from their assigned tasks and
>responsibilities?

Exactly. Did not other large aircraft depart earlier from the proper
runway? All this discussion of FAA/controller responsibility is
misplaced. Perhaps the investigation will reveal that someone
mismarked all the ground signage and biased the aircraft heading
indicators in which case that sounds like a criminal investigation.

Until then, the most likely reason is that the pilots screwed up
royally.

Ron Lee

TheNPC > wrote:

>Looking at all the comments and chatter regarding the
>subject of the Lexington crash this paragraph best hits the
>nail on the head. We will never know the hypothetical out
>come because the FAA violated their own staffing orders at
>Lexington that night. The hypothetical scenario of two
>controllers on duty and the related safety matrix was made
>impossible by the FAA's refusal to staff their ATCT IAW
>their own orders.

Irrelevant. The two pilots on the aircraft were responsible for the
runway they used.

Ron Lee

John Mazor wrote:

>>The NTSB is not the district attorney.
>
>
> Which case do you want to argue here, the technical investigation or the
> tort liability one?

Neither. The district attorney does not handle tort liability cases.~

You argue that the crew "screwed up," as in they made a mistake.
Failing to set the flaps, for example, is a mistake/screw-up.

Taking off on an unlighted runway some 55 minutes before sunrise is not
a mistake.

Mr. Webster's definition of "mistake" in this context reade:

1. incorrect act or decision: an incorrect, unwise, or unfortunate act
or decision caused by bad judgment or a lack of information or care.

Then, there is "gross negligence," which is deliberate misconduct as
opposed to a careless mistake. The generally accepted definition of
gross negligence is:

"Failure to use even the slightest amount of care in a way that shows
recklessness or willful disregard for the safety of others."

The NTSB probably won't go there, although they should. So should the
FAA and the local D.A.

"Ron Lee" > wrote in message
...
>
> Exactly. Did not other large aircraft depart earlier from the proper
> runway? All this discussion of FAA/controller responsibility is
> misplaced. Perhaps the investigation will reveal that someone
> mismarked all the ground signage and biased the aircraft heading
> indicators in which case that sounds like a criminal investigation.
>

Perhaps, but that still wouldn't explain why the crew didn't question the
tower about the lack of runway lights.


>
> Until then, the most likely reason is that the pilots screwed up
> royally.
>

They certainly did, the only question is WHY they screwed up so royally.

The attempt to transfer some responsibility to the controller is absurd.
Sure, he might have caught the error if he had continued to watch the
airplane after he issued the takeoff clearance, but he had no responsibility
to do so. Requiring controllers to bear that responsibility is one possible
fix, but it's a fix that will only work at towered fields, and there are a
lot of untowered fields with commercial passenger traffic. If it's
determined that a fix is needed it must be a fix that will work everywhere.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor wrote:
>
>> "Newps" > wrote in message
>> . ..
>>
>>>John Mazor wrote:
>>>
>>>>I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
>>>>ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.
>>>
>>>No, it's required.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
> That is his opionion, John.

I'm not a controller, so I have to take his assertion on faith, which means
that your observation was implied in my response. But, for the record, so
noted.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...

>> Stephen, you very well know that I have not once tried to excuse the
>> actions of the crew. They screwed up.
>
> Yes, Jon, you said the crew screwed up. But you also imply the controller
> screwed up.

Nonsense. He was properly performing an unrelated but necessary duty.
There's not even a hint of a "screw-up" there.

> Based on what has been reported to date the controller met all of his
> responsibilities without error.

See previous. Nothing I have said here can reasonably be construed to be an
accusation that the controller did anything wrong. (And given how you far
you had to stretch to reach that erroneous conclusion about my statements
raises the question that if anyone here is being defensive about human
performance, it's you regarding the controller.)

> Your interest here is not advancing aviation safety, it's relief of at
> least part of the Comair crew's responsibility for this crash.

Let's see... I've lost count of how many times I've said here that "The crew
screwed up."

If I'm trying to relieve the crew of any responsibility for the crash, I'd
say I'm doing a pretty ****-poor job of it.

The only thing I'm trying to do here is educate people to the fact that if
you only focus on "The crew screwed up, end of discussion" then you are
doing a ****-poor job of accident investigation.

>> Because human beings are not automatons who can be relied upon to
>> perfectly and always repeat the same performance every time under all
>> conditions. That's why we have redundancy and why it is important to
>> reognize when it fails. If all three electrical systems on an aircraft
>> fail, do we just say "Oh, well, the electrics failed, too bad" or do we
>> want to find out why the redundancy of three systems was not adequate in
>> this case? Why should it be any different when it's a human rather than
>> a mechanical failure?
>
> Jon, that doesn't answer my question and I'm confident you know that it
> does not.

If the question was "why did this crew attempt a takeoff when there were so
many indicators that they were on the wrong runway?" then no one, including
the surviving crewmember, can accurately and totally answer it. All you can
do is look at what was happening at the time, plus other possibly related
circumstances, and say "here are some conditions surrounding the accident
that are known to be conducive to human error, and therefore, quite possibly
affected the crew's performance." Since I don't know all those yet, my
answer was a generalized observation that human beings make mistakes.

If that's not satisfactory for you, then let me pose another version of the
same question for you: Why did the LAX controller clear a US Air flight to
land on a runway where she had just parked another aircraft on it in a
"position and hold" thereby "causing" a horrific runway collision with
numerous fatalities?

The NTSB report cited several human factors conditions that were conducive
to such an error by the controller. Was the NTSB's intent in citing those
conditions to absolve the controller of *any* responsibility for the initial
error? Of course not. And ditto for every other accident where "the
controller screwed up." Not only do I not have any problem with that, the
NTSB would be remiss if it didn't include those factors in its findings in
those accidents.

Don't you get it? Yes, in any accident there will be some big, fat smoking
gun that anyone can see - usually a human or mechanical failure. But
before, during, and after the main event, there are other links in the
chain, all of which are not only sufficient, but *necessary* for this chain
to continue unbroken until the accident actually occurs.

Every one of those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking
array of safety protections that have been built into the system. Each and
every one of those failures contributed to the accident. Each and every one
of them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
similar accident scenario. If you think that this part of the investigation
is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by anyone, you just
don't understand the principles of aviation safety.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor wrote:

> You argue that the crew "screwed up," as in they made a mistake. Failing
> to set the flaps, for example, is a mistake/screw-up.
>
> Taking off on an unlighted runway some 55 minutes before sunrise is not a
> mistake.
>
> Mr. Webster's definition of "mistake" in this context reade:
>
> 1. incorrect act or decision: an incorrect, unwise, or unfortunate act or
> decision caused by bad judgment or a lack of information or care.

I'd say that the crew's performance could be described as "lack of ... care"
if they did not perform certain known cross-checks. The investigation also
may determine a "lack of information" available to the crew.

> Then, there is "gross negligence," which is deliberate misconduct as
> opposed to a careless mistake. The generally accepted definition of gross
> negligence is:
>
> "Failure to use even the slightest amount of care in a way that shows
> recklessness or willful disregard for the safety of others."

So the crew "deliberately" acted in a way that represented a "failure to use
even the slightest amount of care" in an issue that had a reasonable
expection that it would result in a fatal accident? Really? First of all,
if they really were failing to exercise the least amount of care, then why
did they properly perform so many other safety checks and procedures as
required? Second, since this recklessness and disregard for safety included
the reasonable expectation that they, or at least the other pilot
("others"), would die in the predictable outcome, please cite evidence that
they both were indifferent to the likely prospect that one or both of them
also would die as a result of their actions.

"Willful disregard"? Again, if they performed the other numerous safety
checks and procedures as required, why would they choose to "willfully
disregard" the ones related to taking the proper runway?

> The NTSB probably won't go there, although they should. So should the FAA
> and the local D.A.

Horse puckey.

Examples of "willful disregard" by pilots do exist. Take the situation of
the two pilots who were discovered nearly naked in the cockpit in flight.
If an accident had occurred while they were in that condition, any attorney
could make a good case for willful disregard. Or the Russian airliner crash
where the captain allowed his son (IIRC) to sit in his seat and operate the
aircraft.

From what we know so far, this accident doesn't come even close to crossing
that line.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "Ron Lee" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> Exactly. Did not other large aircraft depart earlier from the proper
>> runway? All this discussion of FAA/controller responsibility is
>> misplaced. Perhaps the investigation will reveal that someone
>> mismarked all the ground signage and biased the aircraft heading
>> indicators in which case that sounds like a criminal investigation.

Our system has deliberately made the philosophical choice to exclude
criminal law (except in certain extremely limited circumstances) from the
accident investigation process. Given that the parties who provide
critically needed assistance to the NTSB (the airline, the manufacturers,
etc.) already are exposed to the possibility of very expensive tort
liabilities, it's almost miraculous that they do participate and contribute
to the extent that they do. (It helps that by law, in recognition of this
risk, the NTSB report cannot be introduced as evidence in liability cases.)
The minute you introduce the possibility of criminal prosecution, everybody
would shut up, plead the Fifth Amendment (so to speak) and the investigation
would come to a screeching halt.

The reason we made this choice is because society has determined that it's
far more important to keep more people from getting killed in preventable
accidents, than to hang whoever might be criminally convicted as perps.

> Perhaps, but that still wouldn't explain why the crew didn't question the
> tower about the lack of runway lights.

Or the cross-checks, etc. See my previous answer to your similar phrasing
of the question.

>> Until then, the most likely reason is that the pilots screwed up royally.
>
> They certainly did, the only question is WHY they screwed up so royally.

So you do get it. We would never know that from your obsessive attempts to
limit the focus to the part about "the crew screwed up."

> The attempt to transfer some responsibility to the controller is absurd.

And here must lie McNicoll's agenda. He is obsessed with ensuring that no
one give even the slightest hint of controller *error* in this accident. Of
course, no one has done that here - the controller broke no rules in his
actions - but he still thinks that someone is out to spread the "blame" to
the controller by suggesting that he, too, "screwed up". Since McNicoll has
accused me of acting as an agent for the pilots, I now feel free to wonder
if he is actually a controller, whose only goal is to protect his own kind
at all costs.

> Sure, he might have caught the error if he had continued to watch the
> airplane after he issued the takeoff clearance, but he had no
> responsibility to do so. Requiring controllers to bear that
> responsibility is one possible fix, but it's a fix that will only work at
> towered fields, and there are a lot of untowered fields with commercial
> passenger traffic. If it's determined that a fix is needed it must be a
> fix that will work everywhere.

Stephen, you sound more and more like you are a controller.

Not that it's relevant to the worthiness of your arguments, which like mine,
must stand on their own merits. So to the extent that it matters here
(which isn't much), that means that it's up to our readers to judge the
merits of the case we present. And, as I have said before, that's not even
an important goal for me here. I'm trying to explain that any accident
investigation, if it is to do any good at all, must extend well beyond any
obvious finding of human or mechanical failure.

And, as it would now appear, a minor secondary goal for me is to point out
that instead of educating others on the much wider framework of how accident
investigation and the interlocking system of safety checks and balances work
(as I have done), virtually all of his arguments have been aimed at the
extremely limited goal of protecting the controller at all costs.

"John Mazor" > wrote in
:

<snip>
> Correct, but it's up to the investigation to determine which
> "speculative" factors are relevant. I don't know about you, but I'm not
> going to bet the farm that none of the issues that I have mentioned will
> make it into the NTSB report - or even the probable cause statement.

Fortunately, the NTSB has a different mission than the FAA, and from my
perspective is pretty rational and apolitical about their reporting and
investigations. I don't doubt that there is a possibility that the report
will mention the "missing" controller. But I personally don't believe it
will make the probable cause statement. The fact remains that the
possibility that a controller could have "saved the day" is not a
contributing CAUSE of the accident. Both you and I know that the FAA
doesn't make rules exclusively based on NTSB reports, and there may be
rules that the FAA lawyers come up with as a result of this accident
anyway. But nearly every NTSB report I ever read was very carefully worded
to elucidate only facts, and leave speculation to the reader.

<snip>
> Cripes, pay attention, will you? I already have stated repeatedly that
> this is speculative, but as the incident report showed, it's hardly an
> impossible scenario.

From my observations, the NTSB investigates and reports facts. They don't
speculate.

>> The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the
>> Air Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.
>
> So "Incompetent pilots kill passengers in massive cockpit screw-up"
> wouldn't sell as many papers or attract as many viewers?
>
> When fearful flyers strap themselves in, they aren't even thinking about
> controllers. They're worried about ceding all control over their fate
> to the people up in front of the airplane. Or to put it more bluntly,
> when's the last time you heard a Leno or Letterman joke about the air
> traffic controller who showed up drunk at the airport?
>
> Controller error makes it into the news, pilot error sells the news.

Bull. Murder sells better than Manslaughter.

The pilot wasn't drunk or high or lapsing on his medical or currency (at
least not so far as we know to date), so he just made a mistake. People who
make mistakes don't sell nearly as many papers as people who are
irresponsible or negligent. If the paper can claim (however inaccurately)
that a negligent Government Agency was responsible for the murder of 40
innocent passengers, they incite substantially more emotion in their
readers than a story about 40 poor passengers who were killed in an
unfortunate accident caused by a pilot's human fallibility. A good, meaty
anti-authority story about how the government killed 40 people to save a
few thousand dollars a year brings together murder, mystery, and government
corruption - more drama than a miniseries, much less an accident report.

>> What's your mission?
>
> Trying to inject some facts and informed insight into the postings that
> we get from so-called experts on aviation. God forbid that there should
> be innocent lurkers out there who think that the bombastic declarations
> of some of our posters are authoritative, complete, and credible.

So you are trying to "protect" pilots and potential pilots on this
newsgroup by making the claim that pilots don't really need to accept
responsibility for their errors? You're trying to pitch the idea that
controllers will cover their asses? From my perspective, you are trying to
turn attention away from the pilots under the guise of prognostication of
the NTSB report. But your examples of what coulda, shoulda, or woulda
happened are no different than my equally ridiculous example.

Incidentally, your example of the NTSB report from 1990 is a very
interesting choice. The NTSB cites failed coordination between a Ground and
Tower controller as a contributing cause to a runway incursion that
occurred in low visibility conditions at an airport with confusing
markings. That is not speculative. Tower and Ground controllers have very
specific rules and guidelines for coordination of traffic crossing runways,
and if they didn't follow those rules, they contributed to the cause of the
accident. In low visibility conditions, the two controllers basically ran
two planes into each other. That doesn't seem to apply here.

"Judah" > wrote in message
.. .
> "John Mazor" > wrote in
> :
>
> <snip>
>> Correct, but it's up to the investigation to determine which
>> "speculative" factors are relevant. I don't know about you, but I'm not
>> going to bet the farm that none of the issues that I have mentioned will
>> make it into the NTSB report - or even the probable cause statement.
>
> Fortunately, the NTSB has a different mission than the FAA, and from my
> perspective is pretty rational and apolitical about their reporting and
> investigations. I don't doubt that there is a possibility that the report
> will mention the "missing" controller. But I personally don't believe it
> will make the probable cause statement. The fact remains that the
> possibility that a controller could have "saved the day" is not a
> contributing CAUSE of the accident. Both you and I know that the FAA
> doesn't make rules exclusively based on NTSB reports, and there may be
> rules that the FAA lawyers come up with as a result of this accident
> anyway. But nearly every NTSB report I ever read was very carefully worded
> to elucidate only facts, and leave speculation to the reader.

Correct as far as stated. But I hope you also know that the statement of
probable cause is a legal artifact, imposed by Congress in the agency's
charter, that is almost useless to accident investigators and safety
officials. Furthermore, the probable cause statement is the collective
result of the internal agendas and politicking among the staff, and then the
members. I've seen SoPCs significantly modified at the sunshine meeting
just because one member was adamant that his particular concern about the
accident be elevated to the PC spotlight. So you have to digest all of the
findings, recommendations, and the full text of the report if you really
want to get the full import and usefulness of the investigation.

> <snip>
>> Cripes, pay attention, will you? I already have stated repeatedly that
>> this is speculative, but as the incident report showed, it's hardly an
>> impossible scenario.
>
> From my observations, the NTSB investigates and reports facts. They don't
> speculate.

Correct. And if these factors show up in the report, I'll be right. If
not, I'll be wrong.

>>> The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the
>>> Air Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.
>>
>> So "Incompetent pilots kill passengers in massive cockpit screw-up"
>> wouldn't sell as many papers or attract as many viewers?
>>
>> When fearful flyers strap themselves in, they aren't even thinking about
>> controllers. They're worried about ceding all control over their fate
>> to the people up in front of the airplane. Or to put it more bluntly,
>> when's the last time you heard a Leno or Letterman joke about the air
>> traffic controller who showed up drunk at the airport?
>>
>> Controller error makes it into the news, pilot error sells the news.
>
> Bull. Murder sells better than Manslaughter.

So it's murder when a controller does it but just manslaughter when the crew
done it? Or it's murder when the government played a role but just
manslaughter when someoe outside of government done it? No. Your
imagination is getting the better of you again.

As an abstract observation about the news in general, I would readily agree
with that statement, but that's not germane to the issue that is being
discussed here.

> The pilot wasn't drunk or high or lapsing on his medical or currency (at
> least not so far as we know to date), so he just made a mistake. People
> who make mistakes don't sell nearly as many papers as people who are
> irresponsible or negligent. If the paper can claim (however inaccurately)
> that a negligent Government Agency was responsible for the murder of 40
> innocent passengers, they incite substantially more emotion in their
> readers than a story about 40 poor passengers who were killed in an
> unfortunate accident caused by a pilot's human fallibility. A good, meaty
> anti-authority story about how the government killed 40 people to save a
> few thousand dollars a year brings together murder, mystery, and
> government
> corruption - more drama than a miniseries, much less an accident report.

Mmm, I see your point, but if the accident involves errors or violations of
rules and standards by non-government entities, the government - in this
case, the FAA - is still on the hook for failng to adequately regulate and
oversee that situation. (Which, coincidentally, is an actual example of
where one member amended the SoPC - he wanted to spotlight FAA's failure to
monitor a situation that played a role in the accident.) The media is all
too happy to (correctly) skewer government agencies that fail to perform
their appointed oversight responsibilities, and reporting on aviation
accident investigations is no exception.

>>> What's your mission?
>>
>> Trying to inject some facts and informed insight into the postings that
>> we get from so-called experts on aviation. God forbid that there should
>> be innocent lurkers out there who think that the bombastic declarations
>> of some of our posters are authoritative, complete, and credible.
>
> So you are trying to "protect" pilots and potential pilots on this
> newsgroup by making the claim that pilots don't really need to accept
> responsibility for their errors?

What??? Bull****.

> You're trying to pitch the idea that controllers will cover their asses?

Up until tonight, no, but McNicoll's increasingly blatant attempts to do so
now make it clear that that in fact is happening here.

> From my perspective, you are trying to
> turn attention away from the pilots under the guise of prognostication of
> the NTSB report. But your examples of what coulda, shoulda, or woulda
> happened are no different than my equally ridiculous example.

Let's see... my repeated statements here, in clear, blunt, unmistakable
language that "the crew screwed" up" are part of a clever attempt to deflect
attention away from the crew. Wow, I never woulda known that if you hadn't
pointed it out to me. I thought they were a clear, blunt, unmistakable
admission that the principal initiating event was pilot error.

To the extent that other factors such as airport layout and markings, etc.
are shown to have contributed a link in the accident chain, every one of
those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking array of safety
protections that have been built into the system. Each and every one of
them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
similar accident scenario.

So if you think that my calling attention to this aspect of the
investigation is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by the
crew, you still don't understand how aviation safety works.

> Incidentally, your example of the NTSB report from 1990 is a very
> interesting choice. The NTSB cites failed coordination between a Ground
> and
> Tower controller as a contributing cause to a runway incursion that
> occurred in low visibility conditions at an airport with confusing
> markings. That is not speculative. Tower and Ground controllers have very
> specific rules and guidelines for coordination of traffic crossing
> runways,
> and if they didn't follow those rules, they contributed to the cause of
> the
> accident. In low visibility conditions, the two controllers basically ran
> two planes into each other. That doesn't seem to apply here.

Sigh. As I've already noted here, my intent with that citation was not to
perfectly equate the two accidents, but to rebut the idiotic statement that
issues such as airport layout and markings, controller actions ("actions,"
NOT necessarily errors), and other external factors do not have any
relevance to the investigation. By showing an actual and *somewhat* similar
situation where the NTSB did include similar (*not* exactly identical)
factors, I was able to prove that the idiotic statement was wrong.

Do try to keep up. It's annoying enough for me to have to rebut the new
nonsense that gets injected here, without having to go back over old ground.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> I'm not a controller, so I have to take his assertion on faith, which
> means that your observation was implied in my response. But, for the
> record, so noted.
>

Newps isn't a controller either.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> Nonsense. He was properly performing an unrelated but necessary duty.
> There's not even a hint of a "screw-up" there.
>

See your previous messages.


>
> See previous. Nothing I have said here can reasonably be construed to be
> an accusation that the controller did anything wrong. (And given how you
> far you had to stretch to reach that erroneous conclusion about my
> statements raises the question that if anyone here is being defensive
> about human performance, it's you regarding the controller.)
>

Nonsense.


>
> Let's see... I've lost count of how many times I've said here that "The
> crew screwed up."
>
> If I'm trying to relieve the crew of any responsibility for the crash, I'd
> say I'm doing a pretty ****-poor job of it.
>

You got that part right!


>
> The only thing I'm trying to do here is educate people to the fact that if
> you only focus on "The crew screwed up, end of discussion" then you are
> doing a ****-poor job of accident investigation.
>

You do not appear to be in a position to educate anyone about that.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
nk.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> Nonsense. He was properly performing an unrelated but necessary duty.
>> There's not even a hint of a "screw-up" there.
>
> See your previous messages.

I have. Show us one instance where I've stated or even intimated that the
controller made any error. All I've ever said is that because the FAA
violated its own staffing rules, he had to work two positions and therefore,
the possibility that he might have seen the crew take the wrong runway and
warn them was mooted.

>> See previous. Nothing I have said here can reasonably be construed to be
>> an accusation that the controller did anything wrong. (And given how you
>> far you had to stretch to reach that erroneous conclusion about my
>> statements raises the question that if anyone here is being defensive
>> about human performance, it's you regarding the controller.)
>
> Nonsense.

You're sucking wind at this point, McNicoll, running like hell to try to
evade my points.

>> Let's see... I've lost count of how many times I've said here that "The
>> crew screwed up."
>>
>> If I'm trying to relieve the crew of any responsibility for the crash,
>> I'd say I'm doing a pretty ****-poor job of it.
>
> You got that part right!

Duh.

>> The only thing I'm trying to do here is educate people to the fact that
>> if you only focus on "The crew screwed up, end of discussion" then you
>> are doing a ****-poor job of accident investigation.
>
> You do not appear to be in a position to educate anyone about that.

We've apparently reached the point where all you can do is delete my points
and toss out some feeble UseNet dodges in lieu of offering constructive
rebuttals or information.

John Mazor wrote:

>
>
> So the crew "deliberately" acted in a way that represented a "failure to use
> even the slightest amount of care" in an issue that had a reasonable
> expection that it would result in a fatal accident? Really? First of all,
> if they really were failing to exercise the least amount of care, then why
> did they properly perform so many other safety checks and procedures as
> required? Second, since this recklessness and disregard for safety included
> the reasonable expectation that they, or at least the other pilot
> ("others"), would die in the predictable outcome, please cite evidence that
> they both were indifferent to the likely prospect that one or both of them
> also would die as a result of their actions.
>
> "Willful disregard"? Again, if they performed the other numerous safety
> checks and procedures as required, why would they choose to "willfully
> disregard" the ones related to taking the proper runway?
>
If, in fact, they correctly completed all required company check lists
and other procedures, then the company has a systemic problem in not
requiring that runway heading be set on the heading bug.

And, in fact, if they correctly completed all required checks, then went
on to commit a terribily illegal and irresonsible act; i.e., to takeoff
on an unlighted runway (that HAD to be willful, John), then their prior
conduct of preflight is irrelevant and not in any sense mitigating of
that willfully terrible act.

Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum
of professional flight crew conduct.
>
>>The NTSB probably won't go there, although they should. So should the FAA
>>and the local D.A.
>
>
> Horse puckey.

I'll call your "horse puckey" and raise you. "Horse puckey" is a good
indicator you've run out of ideas to keep these jerks from having acted
in a grossly negligent manner.
>
> Examples of "willful disregard" by pilots do exist. Take the situation of
> the two pilots who were discovered nearly naked in the cockpit in flight.
> If an accident had occurred while they were in that condition, any attorney
> could make a good case for willful disregard. Or the Russian airliner crash
> where the captain allowed his son (IIRC) to sit in his seat and operate the
> aircraft.
>
> From what we know so far, this accident doesn't come even close to crossing
> that line.

I couldn't disagree more. Your cites are different types of idiotic
conduct. As to the unauthorized son in the captain's seat I can assure
you I have personally witnessed more than a few ALPA members do about
the same thing, admittedly more in the 1960s and early 1970s than later
years.

>
>

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> So you do get it.

Of course I get it. I've been trying to help you get it.


>
> And here must lie McNicoll's agenda. He is obsessed with ensuring that no
> one give even the slightest hint of controller *error* in this accident.
>

There is no hint of controller error in this accident.


>
> Of course, no one has done that here -
>

You have done that here.


>
> the controller broke no rules in
> his actions - but he still thinks that someone is out to spread the
> "blame" to the controller by suggesting that he, too, "screwed up". Since
> McNicoll has accused me of acting as an agent for the pilots,
>

You have no connection to ALPA?


>
> I now feel
> free to wonder if he is actually a controller, whose only goal is to
> protect his own kind at all costs.
>

I am a controller, frequent users of these forums are aware of that. I have
no goal of protecting controllers at all costs, the controller's union does
that. Just as the pilot's union does it for pilots.


>
> Stephen, you sound more and more like you are a controller.
>
> Not that it's relevant to the worthiness of your arguments, which like
> mine, must stand on their own merits. So to the extent that it matters
> here (which isn't much), that means that it's up to our readers to judge
> the merits of the case we present. And, as I have said before, that's not
> even an important goal for me here. I'm trying to explain that any
> accident investigation, if it is to do any good at all, must extend well
> beyond any obvious finding of human or mechanical failure.
>
> And, as it would now appear, a minor secondary goal for me is to point out
> that instead of educating others on the much wider framework of how
> accident investigation and the interlocking system of safety checks and
> balances work (as I have done), virtually all of his arguments have been
> aimed at the extremely limited goal of protecting the controller at all
> costs.
>

Jon, you may be in a position to educate others on unionism, you are not in
a position to educate others on aviation matters. Your true goal here is
quite clear.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> Up until tonight, no, but McNicoll's increasingly blatant attempts to do
> so now make it clear that that in fact is happening here.
>

McNicoll made no attempt to cover any controller asses here, there's no
controller's ass to cover because the controller made no error.


>
> Let's see... my repeated statements here, in clear, blunt, unmistakable
> language that "the crew screwed" up" are part of a clever attempt to
> deflect
> attention away from the crew. Wow, I never woulda known that if you
> hadn't
> pointed it out to me. I thought they were a clear, blunt, unmistakable
> admission that the principal initiating event was pilot error.
>

No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this
accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from the
crew.


>
> To the extent that other factors such as airport layout and markings, etc.
> are shown to have contributed a link in the accident chain, every one of
> those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking array of
> safety
> protections that have been built into the system. Each and every one of
> them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
> similar accident scenario.
>
> So if you think that my calling attention to this aspect of the
> investigation is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by
> the
> crew, you still don't understand how aviation safety works.
>

Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you think
you have any understanding of how aviation safety works?

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> Up until tonight, no, but McNicoll's increasingly blatant attempts to do
>> so now make it clear that that in fact is happening here.
>
> McNicoll made no attempt to cover any controller asses here, there's no
> controller's ass to cover because the controller made no error.

I rest my case.

>> Let's see... my repeated statements here, in clear, blunt, unmistakable
>> language that "the crew screwed" up" are part of a clever attempt to
>> deflect
>> attention away from the crew. Wow, I never woulda known that if you
>> hadn't
>> pointed it out to me. I thought they were a clear, blunt, unmistakable
>> admission that the principal initiating event was pilot error.
>
> No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this
> accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from
> the crew.

The controller was otherwise occupied, and I never stated or implied that if
he had not been otherwise occupied, the controller *would* have prevented
the accident. Furthermore, I have made clear that even if there had been
the two controllers there and the lone controller had not been responsible
for working both positions, he would not have committed any error if he had
failed to notice the pilot error and warn them.

He *might* have, yes, but that goes to redundancy, one of the safety
concepts that I have contributed to these discussions and which you have
ignored in your determined but unneccesary obsession with ensuring that no
one attributes any controller error to this accident.

>> To the extent that other factors such as airport layout and markings,
>> etc.
>> are shown to have contributed a link in the accident chain, every one of
>> those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking array of
>> safety
>> protections that have been built into the system. Each and every one of
>> them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
>> similar accident scenario.
>>
>> So if you think that my calling attention to this aspect of the
>> investigation is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by
>> the
>> crew, you still don't understand how aviation safety works.
>
> Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you think
> you have any understanding of how aviation safety works?

My many explanations here of how the investigation process and safety system
work, none of which you have acknowledged, let alone refuted.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
> John Mazor wrote:
>
>> So the crew "deliberately" acted in a way that represented a "failure to
>> use even the slightest amount of care" in an issue that had a reasonable
>> expection that it would result in a fatal accident? Really? First of
>> all, if they really were failing to exercise the least amount of care,
>> then why did they properly perform so many other safety checks and
>> procedures as required? Second, since this recklessness and disregard
>> for safety included the reasonable expectation that they, or at least the
>> other pilot ("others"), would die in the predictable outcome, please cite
>> evidence that they both were indifferent to the likely prospect that one
>> or both of them also would die as a result of their actions.
>>
>> "Willful disregard"? Again, if they performed the other numerous safety
>> checks and procedures as required, why would they choose to "willfully
>> disregard" the ones related to taking the proper runway?
>>
> If, in fact, they correctly completed all required company check lists and
> other procedures, then the company has a systemic problem in not requiring
> that runway heading be set on the heading bug.

Each airline has its own FAA-approved procedures and lists, and none of them
is exactly the same. (And it's not uncommon for the airline to change a
procedure after an accident.) The fact that it all is approved by the FAA is
a good starting point in a defense against charges of gross negligence and
willful disregard. It's not an absolute defense, but it can help.

> And, in fact, if they correctly completed all required checks, then went
> on to commit a terribily illegal and irresonsible act; i.e., to takeoff on
> an unlighted runway (that HAD to be willful, John), then their prior
> conduct of preflight is irrelevant and not in any sense mitigating of that
> willfully terrible act.

"Willful" has many definitions. The only one that matters is the legal one,
when it is coupled with "disregard".

> Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
> willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum of
> professional flight crew conduct.

That's not always an absolute rule.

>>>The NTSB probably won't go there, although they should. So should the
>>>FAA and the local D.A.
>>
>> Horse puckey.
>
> I'll call your "horse puckey" and raise you. "Horse puckey" is a good
> indicator you've run out of ideas to keep these jerks from having acted in
> a grossly negligent manner.

If I had just stopped at "horse puckey" and not elucidated with the examples
of what "gross negligence" in the cockpit might really look like, and then
go on to make a comparison, you'd be right. But since I didn't, I wasn't
out of ideas, so you're wrong.

>> Examples of "willful disregard" by pilots do exist. Take the situation
>> of the two pilots who were discovered nearly naked in the cockpit in
>> flight. If an accident had occurred while they were in that condition,
>> any attorney could make a good case for willful disregard. Or the
>> Russian airliner crash where the captain allowed his son (IIRC) to sit in
>> his seat and operate the aircraft.
>>
>> From what we know so far, this accident doesn't come even close to
>> crossing that line.
>
> I couldn't disagree more. Your cites are different types of idiotic
> conduct.

So what does that mean? That they don't rise to the level of "willful
disregard"?

Your self-appointed task here is to show that the Comair crew's behavior
rises to the legal definitions of gross negligence and willful disregard.
I'm not a lawyer, so I'm just musing here, but I would think that a key
factor has to be examining the patterns of behavior both during and
surrounding the alleged acts of willful disregard. Many accidents involve
similar patterns: crew performs flawlessly up until the action in question,
which leaves everyone shaking their head and asking "How did they miss
that?" or "Why did they do that?" To my knowledge, these don't normally
result in successful claims of "gross negligence" or "willful disregard".
Furthermore, the absence of demonstrable gross negligence or willful
disregard doesn't prevent anyone from making a successful tort claim (or
negotiating a settlement), it just sweetens the pot if you can prove it. I
may be wrong, since I don't follow the ensuing liability suits as closely,
but that's my take on it.

Here's the real bottom line: gross negligence and willful disregard are
whatever a judge or jury find them to be. Just as the armchair
quarterbacking here on the accident is meaningless until the NTSB report
comes out, the real proof will come when the liability suits are tried.

> As to the unauthorized son in the captain's seat I can assure you I have
> personally witnessed more than a few ALPA members do about the same thing,
> admittedly more in the 1960s and early 1970s than later years.

It certainly was a different era then, eh? I remember when I was about 8,
being put alone on a Connie for a trip. About halfway into the flight, the
FA asked if I wanted to see the cockpit and escorted me there, where I
chatted with the crew (standing, not sitting!) for a good five minutes, with
the cockpit door wide open all the time.

But that doesn't excuse parental seat-swapping, even then. If it happened
now, the odds are pretty good that the crew would be hearing from the chief
pilot real soon, and there'd be at least one ASRS report filed. Anyone
familiar with airline ops probably can write a book on "stupid pilot
tricks".

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> So you do get it.
>
> Of course I get it. I've been trying to help you get it.

How? By your incessant mantra that there was no controller error - which I
already have stated repeatedly here, just as I have repeatedly noted that
there is demonstrable crew error. So what is it that you're trying to make
me "get"?

>> And here must lie McNicoll's agenda. He is obsessed with ensuring that
>> no
>> one give even the slightest hint of controller *error* in this accident.
>
> There is no hint of controller error in this accident.

I rest my case.

>> Of course, no one has done that here -
>
> You have done that here.

And I repeat my request that you show even one example of me accusing the
controller of any error. You haven't, because you can't.

>> the controller broke no rules in
>> his actions - but he still thinks that someone is out to spread the
>> "blame" to the controller by suggesting that he, too, "screwed up".
>> Since
>> McNicoll has accused me of acting as an agent for the pilots,
>
> You have no connection to ALPA?

Irrelevant. You just blew right past my umpteenth confirmation that the
controller broke no rules - when are you going to admit that and stop
accusing me of something I never said?

>> I now feel
>> free to wonder if he is actually a controller, whose only goal is to
>> protect his own kind at all costs.
>
> I am a controller, frequent users of these forums are aware of that. I
> have no goal of protecting controllers at all costs, the controller's
> union does that. Just as the pilot's union does it for pilots.

Then why are you trying to protect the controller at all costs? I've
admitted numerous times that there is crew error involved.

>> Stephen, you sound more and more like you are a controller.
>>
>> Not that it's relevant to the worthiness of your arguments, which like
>> mine, must stand on their own merits. So to the extent that it matters
>> here (which isn't much), that means that it's up to our readers to judge
>> the merits of the case we present. And, as I have said before, that's
>> not
>> even an important goal for me here. I'm trying to explain that any
>> accident investigation, if it is to do any good at all, must extend well
>> beyond any obvious finding of human or mechanical failure.
>>
>> And, as it would now appear, a minor secondary goal for me is to point
>> out
>> that instead of educating others on the much wider framework of how
>> accident investigation and the interlocking system of safety checks and
>> balances work (as I have done), virtually all of his arguments have been
>> aimed at the extremely limited goal of protecting the controller at all
>> costs.
>
> Jon, you may be in a position to educate others on unionism, you are not
> in a position to educate others on aviation matters. Your true goal here
> is quite clear.

A comparison of the body of information that the two of us have contributed
to the discussion of this accident will show that I have provided far more
information to educate readers than you have.

So do tell us, what is my "true goal" here? To exonerate the crew? "The
crew screwed up" - how many times have I said that?

"The controller committed an error" - how many times have I said that?
(Never.)

"The controller committed no error" - how many times have you said that?
(I've lost count.)

I never killfile anyone, but unless you have something new to contribute
beyond your hollow mantras and UseNet dodges, I see no point in responding
to any more of your "nanner, nanner, are so!" whining. Let us know if and
when you want to contribute anything substantive.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> I have. Show us one instance where I've stated or even intimated that the
> controller made any error.
>

I didn't say you stated it, I said you implied it. Do you want me to post
quotes of you implying it, or should I just post the definition of "imply"?


>
> All I've ever said is that because the FAA
> violated its own staffing rules, he had to work two positions and
> therefore, the possibility that he might have seen the crew take the wrong
> runway and warn them was mooted.
>

Actually, he was probably working about six positions at the time.
Clearance delivery, ground control, local control, all normal tower
positions, plus probably two radar positions and perhaps a flight data
position normally found in the TRACON. FAA policy was not to have all tower
and TRACON positions combined, that's what was violated. Had the policy
been adhered to then all tower positions would have been worked by one
controller in the tower, and all TRACON positions would have been worked by
a second controller physically in the TRACON or in the tower. Jon and most
other laymen have concluded that the policy required two controllers to be
in the tower, that was not the case. The second controller could have been
in the windowless TRACON and thus not able to see the Comair at any point.

The staffing situation is much like that in a 24-hour supermarket. At 2 PM
all checkout aisles may be needed to handle the customer traffic. At 2 AM
one checkout is enough, so staffing is appropriately reduced and all
checkout positions are combined at one aisle with no reduction in service to
the customer.

Reports on the LEX accident do not mention any other aircraft being worked
by the lone controller, either on the field or in the airspace delegated to
the TRACON. So regardless what hat the controller was wearing at the time,
clearance delivery, ground control, local control, etc., the controller
still had only one customer at any moment.


>
> You're sucking wind at this point, McNicoll, running like hell to try to
> evade my points.
>

If you review the thread, you'll see that I've addressed all of your
relevant "points" at least once.


>
> We've apparently reached the point where all you can do is delete my
> points and toss out some feeble UseNet dodges in lieu of offering
> constructive rebuttals or information.
>

You still don't get it.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> I have. Show us one instance where I've stated or even intimated that
>> the
>> controller made any error.
>
> I didn't say you stated it, I said you implied it. Do you want me to post
> quotes of you implying it, or should I just post the definition of
> "imply"?
>
>> All I've ever said is that because the FAA
>> violated its own staffing rules, he had to work two positions and
>> therefore, the possibility that he might have seen the crew take the
>> wrong
>> runway and warn them was mooted.
>
> Actually, he was probably working about six positions at the time.
> Clearance delivery, ground control, local control, all normal tower
> positions, plus probably two radar positions and perhaps a flight data
> position normally found in the TRACON. FAA policy was not to have all
> tower and TRACON positions combined, that's what was violated. Had the
> policy been adhered to then all tower positions would have been worked by
> one controller in the tower, and all TRACON positions would have been
> worked by a second controller physically in the TRACON or in the tower.
> Jon and most other laymen have concluded that the policy required two
> controllers to be in the tower, that was not the case. The second
> controller could have been in the windowless TRACON and thus not able to
> see the Comair at any point.
>
> The staffing situation is much like that in a 24-hour supermarket. At 2
> PM all checkout aisles may be needed to handle the customer traffic. At 2
> AM one checkout is enough, so staffing is appropriately reduced and all
> checkout positions are combined at one aisle with no reduction in service
> to the customer.

I don't have the airport's flight schedule, but I'm under the understanding
that around 6 a.m. is when the departure activity picks up.

That's not a criticism, just an observation that 6 a.m. may not be as dead
as 2 a.m. there.

> Reports on the LEX accident do not mention any other aircraft being worked
> by the lone controller, either on the field or in the airspace delegated
> to the TRACON. So regardless what hat the controller was wearing at the
> time, clearance delivery, ground control, local control, etc., the
> controller still had only one customer at any moment.
>
>> You're sucking wind at this point, McNicoll, running like hell to try to
>> evade my points.
>
> If you review the thread, you'll see that I've addressed all of your
> relevant "points" at least once.
>
>> We've apparently reached the point where all you can do is delete my
>> points and toss out some feeble UseNet dodges in lieu of offering
>> constructive rebuttals or information.

Thank you for the constructive information. I read it with great interest.
(Really.)

As to what you think I implied, not only did I never intend to imply
controller error, but nothing I said could reasonably be interpreted as
such. You are being overly sensitive on that. However, neither of us is
going to change our opinion on that point so there is no point continuing
it. We (the newsgroup collectively) have beaten certain issues to death
here, but additional information is always wecome for discussion.

> You still don't get it.

We all get it, let's move on.

John Mazor wrote:

>
>
>>Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
>>willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum of
>>professional flight crew conduct.
>
>
> That's not always an absolute rule.
>

What is that? Taking an unlighted runway or professional flight crew
conduct?

John Mazor wrote:


>
> Don't you get it? Yes, in any accident there will be some big, fat smoking
> gun that anyone can see - usually a human or mechanical failure. But
> before, during, and after the main event, there are other links in the
> chain, all of which are not only sufficient, but *necessary* for this chain
> to continue unbroken until the accident actually occurs.
>
> Every one of those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking
> array of safety protections that have been built into the system. Each and
> every one of those failures contributed to the accident. Each and every one
> of them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a
> similar accident scenario. If you think that this part of the investigation
> is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by anyone, you just
> don't understand the principles of aviation safety.
>
>
>
I understand the chain of events principle quite well. I will readily
concede that a series of events could cause an aircraft to get lined up
on the wrong runway. But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
mind will remain unchanged.

Having said that, I would be happy to be shown the error of my
conclusions to date.

I understand they did a "rolling takeoff." Well, okay, but once lined
up and rolling it should have become quite apparent, early on in the
roll, "Hey, this runway is dark!" That would have been enough for me to
have "broken the chain" by immediately performing an abort.

Sam Spade wrote:
> But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
> once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
> disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
> to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
> safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
> mind will remain unchanged.
>

On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.

John Galban=====>N4BQ (PA28-180)

wrote:
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>> But, I simply cannot and will not accept that,
>>once lined up on the incorrect runway, a Part 121 flight crew would
>>disregard the lack of runway lights. Unless some hard evidence sufraces
>>to explain how that could happen short of willful disregard of
>>safety/legal operating requirements, the conclusions I have formed in my
>>mind will remain unchanged.
>>
>
>
> On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
> lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
> could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
> thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.
>
> John Galban=====>N4BQ (PA28-180)
>

If the crew was sharp enough to understand that a runway equipped with
centerline lights will have them on when the runway edge lights are on
would also be sharp enough to not accept lack of CL lights as an
acceptble reason to have no runway edge lights. In fact, if they were
that sharp, the lack of Cl and edge lights should have invoked a
cautious reflection, not, "Oh the CL lights aren't supposed to be on
tonight so let's rock and roll.

wrote:

> Sam Spade wrote:

> On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
> lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
> could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
> thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.

Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
under Part 121.

Sam Spade > wrote:

wrote:
>
>> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>> On the day of the accident, there was a NOTAM that the centerline
>> lights on the long runway were OTS. A misinterpretation of the NOTAM
>> could have led the crew not to question the absence of lights. Just a
>> thought. It could have been another possible link in the chain.
>
>Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
>under Part 121.

Plus it is clear that you have to completely cross runway 26 then taxi
more to get to the correct runway 22.

Ron Lee

In article <0wDWg.32302$tO5.12002@fed1read10>,
Sam Spade > wrote:

> Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
> under Part 121.

Not at my Part 121 airline.

From our FAA-approved manual: "Runway lighting is required by FAR 121.97
for takeoff or landing at night. Centerline lights are considered
adequate in the event that the runway edge lights are inoperative."

Beavis wrote:
> In article <0wDWg.32302$tO5.12002@fed1read10>,
> Sam Spade > wrote:
>
>
>>Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
>>under Part 121.
>
>
> Not at my Part 121 airline.
>
> From our FAA-approved manual: "Runway lighting is required by FAR 121.97
> for takeoff or landing at night. Centerline lights are considered
> adequate in the event that the runway edge lights are inoperative."

That is an authorized substitution. It doesn't changed 121.97.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this
>> accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from
>> the crew.
>>
>
> The controller was otherwise occupied,...
>

"Otherwise occupied"? What does that mean? He wasn't playing a video game
or reading a comic book, he was counting strips. An administrative task,
but still part of his job.


>
> ...and I never stated or implied that
> if he had not been otherwise occupied, the controller *would* have
> prevented the accident. Furthermore, I have made clear that even if there
> had been the two controllers there and the lone controller had not been
> responsible for working both positions, he would not have committed any
> error if he had failed to notice the pilot error and warn them.
>
> He *might* have, yes, but that goes to redundancy, one of the safety
> concepts that I have contributed to these discussions and which you have
> ignored in your determined but unneccesary obsession with ensuring that no
> one attributes any controller error to this accident.
>


You didn't? Never? On 9/24/2006, 3:27 PM, John Mazor posted:

>
> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
> The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway
> is irrelevant.
>

"Really? Then why bother having them?"


Jon, those words imply the controller has that responsibility. Did you post
them, or is someone else using your system?


On 9/25/2006, 12:58 AM, John Mazor posted:

>>
>> Really? Then why bother having them?
>>
>
> Controllers? For separation.
>

"And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
any darkened room on the ground will do."

Jon, those words imply a purpose of tower controllers is to see airplanes
deviating from their clearances. Did you post them, or is someone else
using your system?


>>
>> Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you think
>> you have any understanding of how aviation safety works?
>>
>
> My many explanations here of how the investigation process and safety
> system work, none of which you have acknowledged, let alone refuted.
>

I'll have to assume the answer to the first question is, "No." What makes
you think you understand how the investigation process and safety system
work?

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> Each airline has its own FAA-approved procedures and lists, and none of
> them is exactly the same. (And it's not uncommon for the airline to
> change a procedure after an accident.) The fact that it all is approved by
> the FAA is a good starting point in a defense against charges of gross
> negligence and willful disregard. It's not an absolute defense, but it
> can help.
>

Any idea what was on Comair's FAA-approved procedures and lists at the time
of this accident?


>>
>> Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
>> willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum
>> of professional flight crew conduct.
>>
>
> That's not always an absolute rule.
>

Under what circumstances would choosing to depart from an unlighted runway
at night be considered consistent with professional flight crew conduct in
this type of operation?

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> And I repeat my request that you show even one example of me accusing the
> controller of any error. You haven't, because you can't.
>

I never said you accused the controller of making an error, I said you
implied that he had.


>>
>> You have no connection to ALPA?
>>
>
> Irrelevant.
>

It's completely relevant.


>
> You just blew right past my umpteenth confirmation that the
> controller broke no rules - when are you going to admit that and stop
> accusing me of something I never said?
>

I haven't done that, and I think you're intelligent enough to understand
that I haven't. Am I wrong?


>
> Then why are you trying to protect the controller at all costs? I've
> admitted numerous times that there is crew error involved.
>

I'm not trying to protect him at all. Why would you think he needed
protection if you knew he had made no error?


>
> A comparison of the body of information that the two of us have
> contributed to the discussion of this accident will show that I have
> provided far more information to educate readers than you have.
>

Jon, these are aviation forums. You're not in a position to educate anyone
here. There's a lot you could learn here, but it's clear you have no
interest in that. If you'd like to educate someone try
alt.society.labor-unions.


>
> So do tell us, what is my "true goal" here?
>

As I've already said, you're trying to deflect some of the responsibility
for the crash from a couple of dues-paying union members.


>
> I never killfile anyone, but unless you have something new to contribute
> beyond your hollow mantras and UseNet dodges, I see no point in responding
> to any more of your "nanner, nanner, are so!" whining. Let us know if and
> when you want to contribute anything substantive.
>

What makes you think anyone here gives a damn if you respond to their
messages?

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>
> I don't have the airport's flight schedule, but I'm under the
> understanding that around 6 a.m. is when the departure activity picks up.
>
> That's not a criticism, just an observation that 6 a.m. may not be as dead
> as 2 a.m. there.
>


That's probably true of weekdays, probably not true of weekends though. I
seem to recall the LEX tower manager staffed a single position only on
weekend nights. The accident happened on a Sunday.


>
> As to what you think I implied, not only did I never intend to imply
> controller error, but nothing I said could reasonably be interpreted as
> such.
>

What you wrote could only be interpreted as such.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> I'm not trying to protect him at all. Why would you think he needed
> protection if you knew he had made no error?
>

Oops! That should have been, "Why would you think he needed protection if
you knew he hadn't made no error?"

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> Each airline has its own FAA-approved procedures and lists, and none of
>> them is exactly the same. (And it's not uncommon for the airline to
>> change a procedure after an accident.) The fact that it all is approved
>> by
>> the FAA is a good starting point in a defense against charges of gross
>> negligence and willful disregard. It's not an absolute defense, but it
>> can help.
>
> Any idea what was on Comair's FAA-approved procedures and lists at the
> time of this accident?

No, but I'm trying to get some of that. It would be in the Flight
Operations Manual.

>>> Of course they didn't think they were going to die. They nonetheless
>>> willfully took on an unlighted runway, which is contrary to any modicum
>>> of professional flight crew conduct.
>>
>> That's not always an absolute rule.
>
> Under what circumstances would choosing to depart from an unlighted runway
> at night be considered consistent with professional flight crew conduct in
> this type of operation?

As far as I've been able to determine so far, if it is not in the FOM,
nothing precludes a 121 crew from using an unlighted runway. As I said, I'm
still trying to get information on the Comair FOM.

Another poster cited a reference to FAR 121.97. That reg says *nothing*
about whether a crew can use an unlighted runway. It goes to the operator's
requirements with respect to using airports and distributing necessary
information on airports to flight crews.

http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part121-97-FAR.shtml

So while most pilots might say in the abstract that they wouldn't take off
from an unlighted runway, there is no FAR against it as far as I can tell.
So unless it's in the crew's FOM, not only is not an absolute rule, for
them, it's not a rule at all. Granted, that puts it in the realm of an
after-the-fact judgment call as to how "professional" a crew's discretionary
decisions might have been, but that means that it is debatable, and not the
automatic slam-dunk that some here seem to think.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
nk.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> I don't have the airport's flight schedule, but I'm under the
>> understanding that around 6 a.m. is when the departure activity picks up.
>>
>> That's not a criticism, just an observation that 6 a.m. may not be as
>> dead
>> as 2 a.m. there.
>
> That's probably true of weekdays, probably not true of weekends though. I
> seem to recall the LEX tower manager staffed a single position only on
> weekend nights. The accident happened on a Sunday.

Okay, I hadn't thought of that.

>> As to what you think I implied, not only did I never intend to imply
>> controller error, but nothing I said could reasonably be interpreted as
>> such.
>
> What you wrote could only be interpreted as such.

I need to construct a keyboard macro so I don't have to keep retyping my
refutation of your ridiculous accusation.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
news:UOSWg.32348$tO5.22560@fed1read10...
> Beavis wrote:
>> In article <0wDWg.32302$tO5.12002@fed1read10>,
>> Sam Spade > wrote:
>>
>>>Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
>>>under Part 121.
>>
>> Not at my Part 121 airline.
>>
>> From our FAA-approved manual: "Runway lighting is required by FAR 121.97
>> for takeoff or landing at night. Centerline lights are considered
>> adequate in the event that the runway edge lights are inoperative."
>
> That is an authorized substitution. It doesn't changed 121.97.

That's actually wrong. FAR 121.97 says *nothing* about forbidding runway
ops on an unlighted runway. Nor have I found any FAR that does that.
121.97 goes to operator requirements WRT airports and disseminating
information on them to their flight crews.

An airline's FOM might forbid using unlit runways, but there's no
requirement that such a rule be included in its FOM.

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>>
>>> No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this
>>> accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from
>>> the crew.
>>
>> The controller was otherwise occupied,...
>
> "Otherwise occupied"? What does that mean? He wasn't playing a video
> game or reading a comic book, he was counting strips. An administrative
> task, but still part of his job.

Yes, as in he wasn't looking out on the airport runways and taxiways.
"Otherwise occupied."

This is yet another example of you taking a neutral statement and trying to
make it mean that I was implying controller error. How you can leap the
vast chasm necessary to inject terms like "playing a video game" or "reading
a comic book" is beyond me, but then, I'm not paranoid.

>> ...and I never stated or implied that
>> if he had not been otherwise occupied, the controller *would* have
>> prevented the accident. Furthermore, I have made clear that even if
>> there
>> had been the two controllers there and the lone controller had not been
>> responsible for working both positions, he would not have committed any
>> error if he had failed to notice the pilot error and warn them.
>>
>> He *might* have, yes, but that goes to redundancy, one of the safety
>> concepts that I have contributed to these discussions and which you have
>> ignored in your determined but unneccesary obsession with ensuring that
>> no
>> one attributes any controller error to this accident.
>
> You didn't? Never? On 9/24/2006, 3:27 PM, John Mazor posted:
>
>> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
>> The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway
>> is irrelevant.
>
> "Really? Then why bother having them?"
>
> Jon, those words imply the controller has that responsibility. Did you
> post them, or is someone else using your system?

You failed to include my subsequent comment:

"This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up
such a chain, and fixing or preventing them."

This, as well as the comment you cited and others in my post, goes to
redundancy, and redundancy includes things that might happen to prevent an
accident even though the failure for them to happen does not necessarily
involve a mistake or rule violation. For example, a jumpseating pilot might
spot an oncoming aircraft and warn the crew. That's redundancy. If the
crew failed to "see and avoid" and there was a collision, they might well be
cited, but no one is going to violate the jumpseater or accuse him of making
a mistake for failing in his role of redundancy because he didn't see the
airplane.

You still are stretching to make my words mean something that they do not.
You also are ignoring the many, many times that I have stated in clear,
unmistakeable language that the controller made no error.

> On 9/25/2006, 12:58 AM, John Mazor posted:
>
>>> Really? Then why bother having them?
>>
>> Controllers? For separation.
>
> "And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in
> windowed
> cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
> airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a
> tower,
> any darkened room on the ground will do."
>
> Jon, those words imply a purpose of tower controllers is to see airplanes
> deviating from their clearances. Did you post them, or is someone else
> using your system?

Explain why one of the purposes of control towers CANNOT POSSIBLY be to
watch aircraft ground movements, including the possibilty that an aircraft
might deviate from its cleared route.

The operative phrase there was "such as" - of course that's not the only
reason.

>>> Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you
>>> think
>>> you have any understanding of how aviation safety works?
>>
>> My many explanations here of how the investigation process and safety
>> system work, none of which you have acknowledged, let alone refuted.
>
> I'll have to assume the answer to the first question is, "No." What makes
> you think you understand how the investigation process and safety system
> work?

If I told you that I was a corn farmer from Iowa who never got closer to an
aeroplane than my crop duster's flight patterns, would that alter in the
least the validity of anything I've said here?

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
link.net...
>
> "John Mazor" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> And I repeat my request that you show even one example of me accusing the
>> controller of any error. You haven't, because you can't.
>
> I never said you accused the controller of making an error, I said you
> implied that he had.

Implication is in the minds of both the source and the beholder. There was
no intent in my mind, nor was there any reasonable basis for it to form in
the mind of the beholder, but apprently it has in yours.

As I said, we're not going to change each other's minds on this, so there's
no point in going around and around on this.

>>> You have no connection to ALPA?
>>
>> Irrelevant.
>
> It's completely relevant.

If I told you that I was a corn farmer from Iowa who never got closer to an
aeroplane than my crop duster's flight patterns, would that alter in the
least the validity of anything I've said here?

>> Then why are you trying to protect the controller at all costs? I've
>> admitted numerous times that there is crew error involved.
>
> I'm not trying to protect him at all. Why would you think he needed
> protection if you knew he had made no error?

Why do you keep insisting on his innocence if he doesn't need any protection
here?

>> A comparison of the body of information that the two of us have
>> contributed to the discussion of this accident will show that I have
>> provided far more information to educate readers than you have.
>
> Jon, these are aviation forums. You're not in a position to educate
> anyone here.

I suppose the words "newbies" and "lurkers" have no meaning for you. Even
those who are well-informed on GA may not know much about the world of
airline ops.

> There's a lot you could learn here, but it's clear you have no interest in
> that.

Right. I suppose that's why, on 10/7/06, I posted the following in response
to one of the few substantively informative posts you've made here:

"Thank you for the constructive information. I read it with great interest.
(Really.)"

>> So do tell us, what is my "true goal" here?
>
> As I've already said, you're trying to deflect some of the responsibility
> for the crash from a couple of dues-paying union members.

There's a difference between "Don't jump on the crew, it's also somebody
else's fault" and "You can't simply hang the crew for their error and let it
go at that." Apparently the difference is too subtle for you to grasp.

>> I never killfile anyone, but unless you have something new to contribute
>> beyond your hollow mantras and UseNet dodges, I see no point in
>> responding
>> to any more of your "nanner, nanner, are so!" whining. Let us know if
>> and
>> when you want to contribute anything substantive.
>
> What makes you think anyone here gives a damn if you respond to their
> messages?

You, for one, apparently do, and you're the only one I was referring to.

"John Mazor" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Under what circumstances would choosing to depart from an unlighted
>> runway at night be considered consistent with professional flight crew
>> conduct in this type of operation?
>>
>
> As far as I've been able to determine so far, if it is not in the FOM,
> nothing precludes a 121 crew from using an unlighted runway. As I said,
> I'm still trying to get information on the Comair FOM.
>
> Another poster cited a reference to FAR 121.97. That reg says *nothing*
> about whether a crew can use an unlighted runway. It goes to the
> operator's requirements with respect to using airports and distributing
> necessary information on airports to flight crews.
>
> http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part121-97-FAR.shtml
>
> So while most pilots might say in the abstract that they wouldn't take off
> from an unlighted runway, there is no FAR against it as far as I can tell.
> So unless it's in the crew's FOM, not only is not an absolute rule, for
> them, it's not a rule at all. Granted, that puts it in the realm of an
> after-the-fact judgment call as to how "professional" a crew's
> discretionary decisions might have been, but that means that it is
> debatable, and not the automatic slam-dunk that some here seem to think.
>

The question was not to legality but to judgment.

John Mazor wrote:

> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> news:UOSWg.32348$tO5.22560@fed1read10...
>
>>Beavis wrote:
>>
>>>In article <0wDWg.32302$tO5.12002@fed1read10>,
>>> Sam Spade > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>Runway edge lights, unlike CL lights, are mandatory for a night takeoff
>>>>under Part 121.
>>>
>>>Not at my Part 121 airline.
>>>
>>>From our FAA-approved manual: "Runway lighting is required by FAR 121.97
>>>for takeoff or landing at night. Centerline lights are considered
>>>adequate in the event that the runway edge lights are inoperative."
>>
>>That is an authorized substitution. It doesn't changed 121.97.
>
>
> That's actually wrong. FAR 121.97 says *nothing* about forbidding runway
> ops on an unlighted runway. Nor have I found any FAR that does that.
> 121.97 goes to operator requirements WRT airports and disseminating
> information on them to their flight crews.
>
> An airline's FOM might forbid using unlit runways, but there's no
> requirement that such a rule be included in its FOM.
>
>
Oh there isn't? What about 121.590 (d) (2) (i) and (ii)? Bevis'
carrier elected to tie the reference of their ops specs authorization to
substitute CLs for RLs to 121.97, which is fine from a regulatory
standpoint, because 121.97 is subject to 121.590.

I cite the pertinent requirements from 121.50. Note in particular (d) (2).

§ 121.590 Use of certificated land airports in the United States.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, or
unless authorized by the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. 44706(c), no air
carrier and no pilot being used by an air carrier may operate, in the
conduct of a domestic type operation, flag type operation, or
supplemental type operation, an airplane at a land airport in any State
of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any territory or
possession of the United States unless that airport is certificated
under part 139 of this chapter. Further, after June 9, 2005 for Class I
airports and after December 9, 2005 for Class II, III, and IV airports,
when an air carrier and a pilot being used by the air carrier are
required to operate at an airport certificated under part 139 of this
chapter, the air carrier and the pilot may only operate at that airport
if the airport is classified under part 139 to serve the type airplane
to be operated and the type of operation to be conducted.

(d)....

(2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take
off from, or land at, an airport unless--
(i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind
direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of
takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and
(ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are
clearly shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be
used for takeoff or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their
use must be authorized by the Administrator.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
news:Yq5Xg.32373$tO5.1670@fed1read10...
>
> Oh there isn't? What about 121.590 (d) (2) (i) and (ii)? Bevis' carrier
> elected to tie the reference of their ops specs authorization to
> substitute CLs for RLs to 121.97, which is fine from a regulatory
> standpoint, because 121.97 is subject to 121.590.
>
> I cite the pertinent requirements from 121.50. Note in particular (d)
> (2).
>
> § 121.590 Use of certificated land airports in the United States.
> (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, or unless
> authorized by the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. 44706(c), no air carrier
> and no pilot being used by an air carrier may operate, in the conduct of a
> domestic type operation, flag type operation, or supplemental type
> operation, an airplane at a land airport in any State of the United
> States, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the
> United States unless that airport is certificated under part 139 of this
> chapter. Further, after June 9, 2005 for Class I airports and after
> December 9, 2005 for Class II, III, and IV airports, when an air carrier
> and a pilot being used by the air carrier are required to operate at an
> airport certificated under part 139 of this chapter, the air carrier and
> the pilot may only operate at that airport if the airport is classified
> under part 139 to serve the type airplane to be operated and the type of
> operation to be conducted.
>
> (d)....
>
> (2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take
> off from, or land at, an airport unless--
> (i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind
> direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of
> takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and
> (ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are clearly
> shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be used for
> takeoff or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their use must be
> authorized by the Administrator.
>

Why did you delete subparagraph (d)?

(d) An air carrier, a commercial operator, and a pilot being used by the air
carrier or the commercial operator-when conducting a passenger-carrying
airplane operation under this part that is not a domestic type operation, a
flag type operation, or a supplemental type operation-may operate at a land
airport not certificated under part 139 of this chapter only when the
following conditions are met:

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
> "Sam Spade" > wrote in message
> news:Yq5Xg.32373$tO5.1670@fed1read10...
>
>>Oh there isn't? What about 121.590 (d) (2) (i) and (ii)? Bevis' carrier
>>elected to tie the reference of their ops specs authorization to
>>substitute CLs for RLs to 121.97, which is fine from a regulatory
>>standpoint, because 121.97 is subject to 121.590.
>>
>>I cite the pertinent requirements from 121.50. Note in particular (d)
>>(2).
>>
>>§ 121.590 Use of certificated land airports in the United States.
>>(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, or unless
>>authorized by the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. 44706(c), no air carrier
>>and no pilot being used by an air carrier may operate, in the conduct of a
>>domestic type operation, flag type operation, or supplemental type
>>operation, an airplane at a land airport in any State of the United
>>States, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the
>>United States unless that airport is certificated under part 139 of this
>>chapter. Further, after June 9, 2005 for Class I airports and after
>>December 9, 2005 for Class II, III, and IV airports, when an air carrier
>>and a pilot being used by the air carrier are required to operate at an
>>airport certificated under part 139 of this chapter, the air carrier and
>>the pilot may only operate at that airport if the airport is classified
>>under part 139 to serve the type airplane to be operated and the type of
>>operation to be conducted.
>>
>>(d)....
>>
>>(2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take
>>off from, or land at, an airport unless--
>>(i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind
>>direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of
>>takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and
>>(ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are clearly
>>shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be used for
>>takeoff or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their use must be
>>authorized by the Administrator.
>>
>
>
> Why did you delete subparagraph (d)?
>
> (d) An air carrier, a commercial operator, and a pilot being used by the air
> carrier or the commercial operator-when conducting a passenger-carrying
> airplane operation under this part that is not a domestic type operation, a
> flag type operation, or a supplemental type operation-may operate at a land
> airport not certificated under part 139 of this chapter only when the
> following conditions are met:
>
>
Too quick I guess. The missing part imposes the foregoing requirement
on non-Part 139 land airports, which would be an unusual authorization.

But, probably every airport Comair operates into is certified under Part
139; certainly LEX is. Whether this is a distinction with any
difference is doubtful, since Part 139 requirements that have
operational implications become a part of a 121 certificate holder's
operations specifications (which are considered regulatory):

The pertinent part of 139 reads:

§ 139.311 Marking, signs, and lighting.
(a) Marking. Each certificate holder must provide and maintain marking
systems for air carrier operations on the airport that are authorized by
the Administrator and consist of at least the following:
(1) Runway markings meeting the specifications for takeoff and landing
minimums for each runway.
(2) A taxiway centerline.
(3) Taxiway edge markings, as appropriate.
(4) Holding position markings.
(5) Instrument landing system (ILS) critical area markings.
(b) Signs.
(1) Each certificate holder shall provide and maintain sign systems for
air carrier operations on the airport that are authorized by the
Administrator and consist of at least the following:
(i) Signs identifying taxiing routes on the movement area.
(ii) Holding position signs.
(iii) Instrument landing system (ILS) critical area signs.
(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, the signs required
by paragraph (b)(1) of this section must be internally illuminated at
each Class I, II, and IV airport.
(3) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, the signs required
by paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(iii) of this section must be
internally illuminated at each Class III airport.
(c) Lighting. Each certificate holder must provide and maintain lighting
systems for air carrier operations when the airport is open at night,
during conditions below visual flight rules (VFR) minimums, or in
Alaska, during periods in which a prominent unlighted object cannot be
seen from a distance of 3 statute miles or the sun is more than six
degrees below the horizon. These lighting systems must be authorized by
the Administrator and consist of at least the following:
(1) Runway lighting that meets the specifications for takeoff and
landing minimums, as authorized by the Administrator, for each runway.
(2) One of the following taxiway lighting systems:
(i) Centerline lights.
(ii) Centerline reflectors.
(iii) Edge lights.

"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
news:IttXg.32427$tO5.4398@fed1read10...
>>
>> Why did you delete subparagraph (d)?
>>
>> (d) An air carrier, a commercial operator, and a pilot being used by the
>> air carrier or the commercial operator-when conducting a
>> passenger-carrying airplane operation under this part that is not a
>> domestic type operation, a flag type operation, or a supplemental type
>> operation-may operate at a land airport not certificated under part 139
>> of this chapter only when the following conditions are met:
>
> Too quick I guess. The missing part imposes the foregoing requirement on
> non-Part 139 land airports, which would be an unusual authorization.
>
> But, probably every airport Comair operates into is certified under Part
> 139; certainly LEX is.

Exactly. In discussing Comair's attempted night departure from a dark
runway you asserted that runway edge lights are mandatory for a night
takeoff under Part 121,
but the only such requirement in that part applies to airports at which
Comair does not operate.

Not at a controlled field, it's not irrelevant. Try landing on the wrong
runway at a controlled field and see what happens. All of a sudden, the
controller takes control of everything.

But if they let you taxi onto the wrong taxiway, or issue confused
directions because they've been working double shifts, it all of a sudden
becomes 'the pilot's responsibility'???

Or if you break out on an ILS 1/4 mile out and find a Cessna 172 right
underneath you, that's not controller responsibility either, is it?

What planet are you from?

"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> JohnSmith > wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
> @bignews5.bellsouth.net:
>
>> Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
>> double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
>> violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.
>
> Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
> The
> presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
> irrelevant.
>
>> It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.
>
> In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk.
> For
> example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
> FAA, you are certainly able to sue.
>
> Just please stop ranting about it here.
>

Ohhh, screw it. Let's get back to the original reason for this thread.

I think the White employees in the FAA should form a "Whites Only Coalition
Of Federal Aviation Employees". I'll bet even an attempt at such a thing
would be swiftly met with heads rolling and racial discrimination lawsuits.

>> Furthermore, there do not appear to be any racial restrictions on joining
the group."

Then why is it called the "National BLACK Coalition of Federal Aviation
Employees"????

There aren't any restrictions on you joining a Black Little Leage Team
either, is there??



"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
k.net...
>
> "JohnSmith" > wrote in message
> . ..
>>
>> Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a double shift
>> without proper rest combined with the FAA violating their own staffing
>> orders at KLEX.
>>
>> It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.
>>
>
> How is the FAA liable? The tower controller did everything required and
> without any error. What might have been different had the staffing policy
> been followed and a second controller had been on duty in the TRACON?
>

"Mike Fergione" > wrote in news:1Yn6h.269117
:

> Not at a controlled field, it's not irrelevant. Try landing on the wrong
> runway at a controlled field and see what happens. All of a sudden, the
> controller takes control of everything.

The controller may take control and attempt to continue to properly
separate traffic. But if you are short final on a runway at a towered
airport, and another plane lands on your runway, you do a go around
regardless of whether you were cleared by the tower. You don't wait for the
tower controller to tell you to go around.

> But if they let you taxi onto the wrong taxiway, or issue confused
> directions because they've been working double shifts, it all of a sudden
> becomes 'the pilot's responsibility'???

If the directions are too confusing for the pilot to understand, it is his
responsibility to ask for proper directions. If a controller issues an
instruction to taxi on an incorrect taxiway, if the pilot sees another
plane coming at him, the pilot's responsibility is to stop or divert, not
to blindly follow the instructions of the tower.

> Or if you break out on an ILS 1/4 mile out and find a Cessna 172 right
> underneath you, that's not controller responsibility either, is it?

What are you proposing is controller responsibility here? That there was a
Cessna 172 right underneath you when you broke out on the ILS? Was the
Cessna 172 under ATC control? Did it violate the FARs by flying too close
to the clouds? Did it have a working transponder?

In visual conditions, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other
traffic, regardless of whether he is under ATC control or not.

ATC is responsible for separation of IFR traffic. But that was not an issue
in LEX.

What I mean by "All of a sudden, the controller takes control of everything"
is, you are going to be instructed to call the tower upon landing. That
will start the ball rolling to you losing your certificate, and the
controller you are suggesting was not at fault is going to be the catalyst,
and the most important witness for you losing it.

If that doesn't imply some sort of 'ultimate authority', I'm at a loss.

If your argument was true, a pilot's defense would simply be "I'm the final
authority, and it was my choice, not yours". There would be no violations
by ATC. They will violate you when it was your fault but when it's their
fault, they hide behind the 'ultimate authority' clause in the FAR's.


"Judah" > wrote in message
. ..
> "Mike Fergione" > wrote in news:1Yn6h.269117
> :
>
>> Not at a controlled field, it's not irrelevant. Try landing on the wrong
>> runway at a controlled field and see what happens. All of a sudden, the
>> controller takes control of everything.
>
> The controller may take control and attempt to continue to properly
> separate traffic. But if you are short final on a runway at a towered
> airport, and another plane lands on your runway, you do a go around
> regardless of whether you were cleared by the tower. You don't wait for
> the
> tower controller to tell you to go around.
>
>> But if they let you taxi onto the wrong taxiway, or issue confused
>> directions because they've been working double shifts, it all of a sudden
>> becomes 'the pilot's responsibility'???
>
> If the directions are too confusing for the pilot to understand, it is his
> responsibility to ask for proper directions. If a controller issues an
> instruction to taxi on an incorrect taxiway, if the pilot sees another
> plane coming at him, the pilot's responsibility is to stop or divert, not
> to blindly follow the instructions of the tower.
>
>> Or if you break out on an ILS 1/4 mile out and find a Cessna 172 right
>> underneath you, that's not controller responsibility either, is it?
>
> What are you proposing is controller responsibility here? That there was a
> Cessna 172 right underneath you when you broke out on the ILS? Was the
> Cessna 172 under ATC control? Did it violate the FARs by flying too close
> to the clouds? Did it have a working transponder?
>
> In visual conditions, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other
> traffic, regardless of whether he is under ATC control or not.
>
> ATC is responsible for separation of IFR traffic. But that was not an
> issue
> in LEX.

"Mike Fergione" > wrote in
:

> What I mean by "All of a sudden, the controller takes control of
> everything" is, you are going to be instructed to call the tower upon
> landing. That will start the ball rolling to you losing your
> certificate, and the controller you are suggesting was not at fault is
> going to be the catalyst, and the most important witness for you losing
> it.
>
> If that doesn't imply some sort of 'ultimate authority', I'm at a loss.

So if I witness a robbery, and call the police, does that make me the
'ultimate authority' for the safety of the bank?

The pilot has the ultimate responsible for safety of flight. Period.
Following ATC instructions, barring a specific reason not to, is part of
ensuring safety of flight.

Had there been a legitimate safety reason for violating the ATC instruction,
no action would be taken against the pilot. At worst I imagine he might get
chastised for failing to properly inform ATC of his inability to comply with
their request, so that they could safely coordinate with other planes in
their airspace.

Making a random choice in contrast to an ATC request is not safe, and is not
a legitimate safety reason for violating an ATC instruction.

> If your argument was true, a pilot's defense would simply be "I'm the
> final authority, and it was my choice, not yours". There would be no
> violations by ATC. They will violate you when it was your fault but
> when it's their fault, they hide behind the 'ultimate authority' clause
> in the FAR's.

If what you said was true, Pilots would be required to follow ATC
instructions without the ability to declare an emergency or respond "unable".
However, if ATC issues an instruction, and the pilot cannot follow it, the
pilot has the authority (and responsibility) to respond that he is unable to
comply and ATC will react appropriately. This even applies in IMC.

Another example of this is the policy to require reaction to TCAS Resolution
Advisories, even if they conflict with ATC clearances.

http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/AERO/miscinst.htm

If ATC is the final authority, then each instance of this would be
actionable. But that is not the case, and the FAA and ICAO have even put out
orders and advisories to help ensure that ATC controllers are properly
trained on how to deal with planes that take TCAS action.

http://www.arinc.com/downloads/tcas/ttp_industry_alert_bulletin.pdf

Judah wrote:
> "Mike Fergione" > wrote in
> :
>
>
>>What I mean by "All of a sudden, the controller takes control of
>>everything" is, you are going to be instructed to call the tower upon
>>landing. That will start the ball rolling to you losing your
>>certificate, and the controller you are suggesting was not at fault is
>>going to be the catalyst, and the most important witness for you losing
>>it.
>>
>>If that doesn't imply some sort of 'ultimate authority', I'm at a loss.
>
>
> So if I witness a robbery, and call the police, does that make me the
> 'ultimate authority' for the safety of the bank?
>
> The pilot has the ultimate responsible for safety of flight. Period.
> Following ATC instructions, barring a specific reason not to, is part of
> ensuring safety of flight.
>
> Had there been a legitimate safety reason for violating the ATC instruction,
> no action would be taken against the pilot. At worst I imagine he might get
> chastised for failing to properly inform ATC of his inability to comply with
> their request, so that they could safely coordinate with other planes in
> their airspace.
>
> Making a random choice in contrast to an ATC request is not safe, and is not
> a legitimate safety reason for violating an ATC instruction.
>
>
>>If your argument was true, a pilot's defense would simply be "I'm the
>>final authority, and it was my choice, not yours". There would be no
>>violations by ATC. They will violate you when it was your fault but
>>when it's their fault, they hide behind the 'ultimate authority' clause
>>in the FAR's.
>
>
> If what you said was true, Pilots would be required to follow ATC
> instructions without the ability to declare an emergency or respond "unable".
> However, if ATC issues an instruction, and the pilot cannot follow it, the
> pilot has the authority (and responsibility) to respond that he is unable to
> comply and ATC will react appropriately. This even applies in IMC.
>
> Another example of this is the policy to require reaction to TCAS Resolution
> Advisories, even if they conflict with ATC clearances.
>
> http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/AERO/miscinst.htm
>
> If ATC is the final authority, then each instance of this would be
> actionable. But that is not the case, and the FAA and ICAO have even put out
> orders and advisories to help ensure that ATC controllers are properly
> trained on how to deal with planes that take TCAS action.
>
> http://www.arinc.com/downloads/tcas/ttp_industry_alert_bulletin.pdf

The "new" goal of the FAA is to create more layers of
worthless Management, less real workers, promote unqualified
minorities and remove and discard experienced white male
employees so lesbian women(ex-secretaries) can be in charge
and feel good about themselves.

Air Safety is not on the radar any longer within the "New"
FAA. It has become a social engineering cluster
****/alphabet soup empire in Washington D.C. burning tax
dollars like drunken sailors.

Privatize Air Traffic Control and ban affirmative action and
social engineering.